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TheJudicialpower of the United States shall not be construed to extend to
any suit in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted against one of the
United States by Citizens of another State, or by Citizens or Subjects of
any Foreign State.
-Eleventh Amendment to the United States Constitution
INTRODUCTION

The varied ways in which the Supreme Court has reached beyond
the literal language of the eleventh amendment in an effort to articulate
its true meaning are familiar to all who study, teach or practice in the
field.' The eleventh amendment speaks of barring suits prosecuted
against a state by "citizens of another State,"' 2 but the Court has not
1. A sampling of recent commentary on the topic might include C. JACOBS, THE
ELEVENTH AMENDMENT AND SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY (1972);J. ORTH, THE JUDICIAL POWER OF
THE UNITED STATES: THE ELEVENTH AMENDMENT IN AMERICAN HISTORY (1987); M. REDISH,
FEDERAL JURISDICTION: TENSIONS IN THE ALLOCATION OF JUDICIAL POWER 139-68 (1980);
Engdahl, Immunity and Accountabilityfor Positive Governmental Wrongs, 44 U. COLO. L. REV. I
(1972); Field, The Eleventh Amendment and Other Sovereign Immunity Doctrines: Part One, 126 U.

PA. L. REV. 515 (1978) [hereinafter Field, Part One]; Field, The Eleventh Amendment and Other
Sovereign Immunity Doctrines: CongressionalImposition of Suit Upon the States, 126 U. PA. L. REV.

1203 (1978) [hereinafter Field, Part Two]; Fletcher, A Historical Interpretation of the Eleventh
Amendment: A Narrow Constructionof an Affirmative GrantofJurisdiction Rather Than a Prohibition
Against Jurisdiction, 35 STAN. L. REV. 1033 (1983); Gibbons, The Eleventh Amendment and State
Sovereign Immunity: A Reinterpretation, 83 COLUM. L. REV. 1889 (1983); Lichtenstein, Retroactive Relief in the Federal Courts Since Edelman v. Jordan: A Trip Through the Twilight Zone, 32
CASE W. RES. 364 (1982); Nowak, The Scope of CongressionalPower to Create Causes of Action
Against State Governments and the History of the Eleventh and Fourteenth Amendments, 75 COLUM.
L. REV. 1413 (1975); Shapiro, lWrong Turns: The Eleventh Amendment and the Pennhurst Case,
98 HARV. L. REV. 61 (1984); Tribe, Intergovernmental Immunities in Litigation, Taxation, and
Regulation: Separation of Powers Issues in Controversies About Federalism, 89 HARV. L. REV. 682
(1976).
2. U.S. CONST. amend. XI.
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hesitated to apply it to suits brought by citizens of the state being sued. 3
The eleventh amendment speaks in classic subject matter jurisdiction
terms by limiting the "judicial power of the United States," 4 but the
Court has suggested that states may waive the jurisdictional bar and that
Congress may override it by legislative action. 5 The eleventh amendment speaks of barring suits "in law or equity," but it has been applied
to suits in admiralty as well, 6 and has been ignored in some suits in equity based on the legal fiction that suits to enjoin state officials from
enforcing allegedly unconstitutional state laws are not suits against the
state. 7 As one commentator noted: "One might expect that a look at
the language of the eleventh amendment would help resolve most sovereign immunity issues. The problem is that the eleventh amendment is
'8
universally taken not to mean what it says."
Perhaps the foremost cause of the Supreme Court's difficulties with
the eleventh amendment is the first impression it typically generates
that, however unambiguous it might appear, it makes no sense. What
ever could have possessed the drafters of the eleventh amendment to
bar suits against a state only by citizens of other states? This question
leads inescapably to the answer that the drafters could not have intended such a bizarre result. However, interpreting the eleventh
amendment to bar all suits against states in federal court creates other
difficulties. Consider, for example, the obstacles to enforcing the fourteenth amendment if states cannot be sued in federal court. Inevitably,
exceptions to such an interpretation of the eleventh amendment would
have to be recognized to make its application more tolerable. The result
was preordained. As one judge recently observed: "Any step through
the looking glass of the eleventh amendment leads to a wonderland of
judicially created and perpetuated fiction and paradox." 9
Several commentators in recent years have advocated alternative interpretations of the eleventh amendment in an effort to avoid this pre3. See, e.g., Atascadero State Hosp. v. Scanlon, 473 U.S. 234 (1985); Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651 (1974); Employees of Dep't of Pub. Health & Welfare v. Department of
Pub. Health & Welfare [hereinafter Employees], 411 U.S. 279 (1973); Hans v. Louisiana, 134
U.S. 1 (1890).
4. U.S. CONST. amend. XI. It could not have been merely coincidental that its drafters chose to begin the eleventh amendment with the same language that introduces article
III. That language has been uniformly interpreted to refer to subject matter jurisdiction of
the federal courts. See C. WRIGHT, LAW OF FEDERAL COURTS § 8, at 26 (4th ed. 1983).
5. See, e.g., Employees, 411 U.S. 279 (1973). There the Court noted that the eleventh

amendment stands as a barrier to federal court suits "against a nonconsenting state." Id.
at 284. It also suggested the pertinent inquiry was "whether Congress has brought the
States to heel, in the sense of lifting their immunity from suit in a federal court." Id. at
283. Though the Court ultimately concluded that Congress had not done so, the obvious

implication of its question was that Congress could do so if it wished. Id.
6. Florida Dep't of State v. Treasure Salvors, Inc., 458 U.S. 670, 683 n. 17 (1982); Ex
parte New York, No. 1,256 U.S. 490, 497-500 (1921). Contra United States v. Bright, 24 F.
Cas. 1232, 1236 (C.C.D. Pa. 1809) (No. 14,647).
7. Exparte Young, 209 U.S. 123, 159-60 (1908).
8. Field, Part One, supra note 1. at 516 (emphasis in original).
9.

Spicer v. Hilton, 618 F.2d 232, 235 (3d Cir. 1980).

DENVER UNIVERSITY LA W REVIEW

[Vol. 64:3

dicament.10 Their premise is that the drafters of the eleventh
amendment meant what they said. These commentators conclude that
the eleventh amendment does not prohibit suits by citizens against their
own states. I I This conclusion makes sense. Nonetheless, in Atascadero
State Hospital v. Scanlon, 12 the Court's most significant recent eleventh
amendment decision, a bare majority of the Court rejected this view of
the eleventh amendment.13
The purpose of this article, however, is only secondarily to urge the
adoption of a more literal interpretation of the eleventh amendment as a
means of solving the eleventh amendment's conceptual dilemmas. Its
primary purpose is to suggest that the body of eleventh amendment case
law prior to Atascadero, although seemingly in hopeless disarray, can be
synthesized into an analytical framework that is both sensible and workable. Atascadero misinterprets, neglects or rejects the framework erected
by these cases, which explains the title of this article.
Part I will describe four key eleventh amendment cases decided in
the last twenty-five years and the problems that have been presented for
those attempting to derive from these cases a comprehensible framework for eleventh amendment analysis. Part II will explain how these
cases can be reconciled with each other in a workable construct consistent with the proposed literal interpretation of the eleventh amendment.
Part III will examine and criticize the Court's holding in Atascadero.
I.

KEY ELEVENTH AMENDMENT CASES

The eleventh amendment has generated considerable litigation in
the past fifteen years, including six major Supreme Court decisions and
at least eight minor ones. 14 Its earlier history was more circumspect.
Although the eleventh amendment was mentioned in several Supreme
Court decisions in the early 1800's,15 the Court's most significant rul-

ings were not made until after the ratification of the Civil War amend10. Redish, supra note 1; Field, Part One, supra note 1; Field, Part Two, supra note 1;
Fletcher, supra note 1; Gibbons, supra note 1.
11. Redish, supra note 1, at 152; Field, Part One, supra note 1, at 544; Fletcher, supra
note 1, at 1060.

12. 473 U.S. 234 (1985).
13. In Atascadero the majority reaffirmed what it considered to be the holding of Hans
v. Louisiana "that the Amendment barred a citizen from bringing a suit against his own
State in federal court, even though the express terms of the Amendment do not so provide." Atascadero, 473 U.S. at 238 (1985).
14. The six major cases are Welch v. State Department of Highways & Public Transportation, 107 S. Ct. 2941 (1987); Atascadero State Hosp. v. Scanlon, 473 U.S. 234 (1985);
Pennhurst State School & Hosp. v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89 (1984); Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer,
427 U.S. 445 (1976); Edelman v.Jordan, 415 U.S. 651 (1974); and Enployees, 411 U.S. 279
(1973). The minor cases include Papasan v. Allain, 106 S.Ct. 2932 (1986); Green v. Mansour, 474 U.S. 64 (1985); Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S. 159 (1985); County of Oneida v.
Oneida Indian Nation, 470 U.S. 226 (1985); Cory v. White, 457 U.S. 85 (1982); Florida
Dep't of Health & Rehabilitative Serv. v. Florida Nursing Home Ass'n, 450 U.S. 147 (1981)
(per curiam); Quern v.Jordan, 440 U.S. 332 (1979); Hutto v. Finney, 437 U.S. 678 (1978).
15. Governor of Ga. v. Madrazo, 26 U.S. (1 Pet.) 110 (1828); Osborn v. Bank of the
United States, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 738 (1824); Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 264
(1821).
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ments 16 and the general grant by Congress in 1875 of federal question
jurisdiction. 17 The earliest key Supreme Court decisions interpreting
the eleventh amendment were Hans v. Louisiana 18 in 1890, and Ex parte
Young' 9 in 1908. Hans held that neither a citizen nor a noncitizen can
sue a state in federal court. 20 In Ex parte Young, a decision that would
21
have major ramifications for future fourteenth amendment litigation,
the Court held that a suit against a state official to enjoin enforcement of
an unconstitutional state law was not a suit against the state for eleventh
22
amendment purposes.
The major catalyst to the modern influx of eleventh amendment litigation was Parden v. Terminal Railway Co., decided in 1964.23 Parden, and
three key cases that followed it, Employees of the Department of Public Health
& Welfare v. Department of Public Health & Welfare (Employees),24 Edelman v.
Jordan,25 and Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer,2 6 form a quartet which provides the
framework of modern eleventh amendment analysis.
A.

Parden v. Terminal Railway Co.

Parden2 7 was a lawsuit brought under the Federal Employer's Liability Act (FELA) 28 by an Alabama railroad employee against his employer.
The state of Alabama owned the railroad and raised the affirmative defense of sovereign immunity under the eleventh amendment. Because
16. U.S. CONST. amends. XIII, XIV, & XV.
17. Act of March 3, 1875, ch. 137, § 1, 18 Stat. 470 (1875) (codified as amended at 28
U.S.C. § 1331 (1982)).
18. 134 U.S. 1 (1890).
19. 209 U.S. 123 (1908).
20. 134 U.S. 1, 15 (1890).
21. The Court has more recently noted that Ex parte Young is a watershed case which
has permitted "the Civil War Amendments to the Constitution to serve as a sword, rather
than merely as a shield, for those whom they were designed to protect." Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 664 (1974). A number of landmark cases striking down state statutes
on constitutional grounds could not have been heard by the federal courts were it not for
Ex parte Young. See, e.g., Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38 (1985) (meditation or voluntary
prayer in the public schools); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973) (abortion); Baker v. Carr,
369 U.S. 186 (1962) (state legislative reapportionment); Brown v. Board of Educ. of Topeka, 347 U.S. 483 (1954) (racially segregated public schools).
22. In Ex Parte Young, the Court held that a state official acting in conflict with the
Constitution "is in that case stripped of his official or representative character and is subjected in his person to the consequences of his individual conduct." 209 U.S. at 160.
From that premise the Court adopted the fiction that a suit to enjoin a state official from
enforcing an allegedly unconstitutional state law is not a suit against a state for eleventh
amendment purposes, although the consequences of the injunction are certainly felt by the
state, and although, for fourteenth amendment purposes, the actions of the state official
would still be considered "state action." Id. at166-68. However, the Court has refused to
extend this reasoning to suits seeking lump sum money damages or restitution, even those
couched in terms of injunctive relief, when the source of relief would be the state treasury.
Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 668-69 (1974).
23. 377 U.S. 184 (1964).
24. 411 U.S. 279 (1973).
25. 415 U.S. 651 (1974).
26. 427 U.S. 445 (1976).
27. 377 U.S. 184 (1964).
28. Federal Employer's Liability Act, ch. 149, 35 Stat. 65, as amended bv Act of Aug. 11,
1939, ch. 685, 53 Stat. 1404 (codified at 45 U.S.C. §§ 51-60 (1982)).
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the plaintiff sought a damage award to be paid out of the state treasury
rather than injunctive relief against state officials, 2 9 Ex Parte Young was
not applicable. Justice Brennan, who would later become a key figure in
a short, ambigumodern eleventh amendment jurisprudence,3 0 wrote
31
ous opinion for a bare majority of five justices.
1. Justice Brennan's Majority Opinion
Justice Brennan noted that although the literal language of the eleventh amendment did not prohibit suits by citizens against their own
states, Hans v. Louisiana had nevertheless held that unconsenting states
were immune from suit in federal court. He distinguished Hans by noting that Congress had authorized suits under the FELA against any railroads operating in interstate commerce, whether publicly or privately
owned. Congress, he asserted, was empowered to subject Alabama to
suits because each state surrendered a portion of its sovereignty to Congress by ratifying the commerce clause. 32 Acknowledging that a state
still could not be sued in federal court without its consent, he noted that
the issue of consent was itself a question of federal law. 3 3 Despite state
law to the contrary, 3 4 Justice Brennan held that Alabama had consented
to suit in federal court by entering into the interstate railroad business
with full knowledge that such conduct would bring it within the provithat Alabama could not claim immusions of the FELA. He concluded
35
nity from suit in federal court.
The ambiguity in Justice Brennan's majority opinion concerns the
interrelationship between his "surrender" and "consent" theories. On
one hand, if the states had surrendered their sovereignty to Congress by
ratifying the commerce clause in 1789, as Justice Brennan suggested,
then why did it matter whether Alabama had subsequently consented to
this suit? Was it not enough that Congress had used the commerce
.power given to it by the states to enact the FELA? On the other hand, if
it is true that, as Justice Brennan said, "tilt remains the law that a State
may not be sued by an individual without its consent,"'3 6 then in what
sense did the states surrender their sovereignty to Congress in 1789?
29. 377 U.S. at 184 (1964).
30. See Field, Part Two, supra note 1, at 2010.
31. 377 U.S. at 198. Chief Justice Warren and Justices Black, Goldberg and Clark
joined in Justice Brennan's opinion for the Court. Justices White, Douglas, Harlan and
Stewart dissented.
32. Id. at 191.
33. Id. at 196. Justice Brennan observed that Congress could condition state participation in interstate commerce on states waiving their immunity from suits in federal court
related to those activities. Such congressional authority would be rendered meaningless if
a state, "on the basis of its own law or intention, could conclusively deny the waiver and
shake off the condition." Id. As Alabama's activity involved interstate commerce, the
question of its consent to suit was necessarily a question of federal law.
34. ALA. CONST. art. I, § 14 states that "the State of Alabama shall never be made a
defendant in any court of law or equity."
35. 377 U.S. at 192.
36. Id.
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Justice White's Dissent

Justice White wrote a short dissent which three other Justices
joined. Justice White started with the proposition that states enjoy constitutional immunity from suits in federal court. 37 He then focused on
Congress' enactment of the FELA as it related to Alabama's alleged consent to this suit. He argued that, while Congress certainly had the power
to condition a state's entry into the interstate transportation business on
its consent to suits arising out of that business, the Court should demand a clear manifestation of that congressional intent before recognizing such a result. Justice White pointed to a line of cases holding that a
waiver of sovereign immunity could only be based on "the most express
language,"'38 and noted that the FELA contained no such language. He
concluded that Alabama could not be subjected to this suit in the federal
courts.

B.

39

Employees of the Department of Public Health & Welfare v.
Department of Health & Welfare

Employees 40 was a lawsuit brought by a class of mental hospital employees against its employer, the state of Missouri, for overtime wages
owed to them under the 1966 amendments to the Fair Labor Standards
Act (FLSA). 4 1 Here the Court found the suit barred by the eleventh
amendment. The majority opinion was written by Justice Douglas, one
of the dissenters in Parden. Justice Marshall, who joined the Court after
Parden was decided, concurred in the result. 4 2 Justice Brennan, author
43
of the Parden opinion, dissented alone.
1. Justice Douglas' Majority Opinion
Justice Douglas began by explaining that, although the eleventh
37. Id. at 198 (White, J.,dissenting).
38. Id. at 200 (White, J., dissenting) (citing Ford Motor Co. v. Department of Treasury, 323 U.S.459, 468-70 (1945); Murray v. Wilson Distilling Co., 213 U.S. 151, 171
(1909)). It should be noted that the cases relied on by Justice White were not cases where
the alleged "waiver" of state immunity was found in congressional legislation. Ford .Volor
Co. involved an ambiguous state statute which the Court construed as limiting consent to
suits in state courts. Murray involved state legislation which dissolved the state liquor control board and created a special commission to dispose of the assets held by the board. Id.
at 160-61. Plaintiffs, who sued the commission in federal court, asserted that the state had
relinquished control over these assets so that a suit against the commission was not a suit
against the state within the meaning of the eleventh amendment. Id. at 170. The Court
disagreed, holding that such an interpretation of the state statute would only be adopted if
supported "by the most express language, or by such overwhelming implication from the
text as would leave no room for any other reasonable construction." Id. at 171.
39. 377 U.S. at 200 (White, J., dissenting).
40. Employees, 411 U.S. 279 (1973).
41. Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938, ch. 676, 52 Stat. 1060 (1938), as amended by Fair
Labor Standards Act of 1966, Pub. L. No. 89-601, 80 Stat. 830 (1966) (codified at 29
U.S.C. § 201-19 (1982)).
42. 411 U.S. at 287 (Marshall, J., concurring). Justice Marshall was joined by Justice
Stewart, a dissenter in Parden.
43. None of the four members of the Court who joined injustice Brennan's majority
opinion in Parden was on the Court when Employees was decided.
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amendment did not literally apply to citizen suits, Hans v. Louisiana had
held that unconsenting states were constitutionally immune from both
citizen and noncitizen suits in the federal courts. 4 4 Justice Douglas acknowledged that the issue was whether this case was controlled by the
holding of Parden. He noted that in Parden, suit had been allowed
against Alabama based on waiver or consent. 4 5 He found Parden distinguishable from Employees by the nature of the
state activities and the stat46
utory authority involved in the two cases.
Justice Douglas examined the state activities involved in each case.
In Parden, Alabama had entered into the proprietary field of running an
interstate railroad. 4 7 By contrast, in Employees, Missouri had done nothing more than engage in the traditionally governmental and nonproprie48
tary function of running state mental hospitals.
With respect to the statutory authority for the respective suits, Justice Douglas acknowledged that in Employees, as in Parden, Congress had
acted pursuant to its commerce clause power. However, because of the
nature of Missouri's governmental activities, the harshness of the double
damage penalty Congress imposed on FLSA violators, and the availability of other enforcement mechanisms besides private suits, he concluded
that it would be inappropriate to assume that Congress intended to
bring "the states to heel, in the sense of lifting their immunity from suit
in a federal court," 4 9 merely because Congress had included certain
state operations within the FLSA definition of "employer." ' 50 He was
unwilling to permit this suit to proceed without an explicit statement by
Congress that the FLSA's grant ofjurisdiction to the federal courts in5
cluded the power to entertain private enforcement suits against states. '
Justice Douglas' opinion in Employees, like Justice Brennan's opinion
44. 411 U.S. at 280.
45. Id. at 284. Both Justice Douglas in Employees and Justice Brennan in Parden appeared to use the terms "consent" and "waiver" interchangeably. While "consent" is
sometimes viewed as involving a more conscious choice on the part of the decision maker
than is present in the case of "waiver," it does not appear that either Justice Douglas or
Justice Brennan intended to draw such a distinction. See, e.g., BLACK'S LAw DICTIONARY
276 (5th ed. 1979) ("Consent is an act of reason, accompanied with deliberation, the mind
weighing as in a balance the good or evil on each side."); id. at 1416 (Waiver "may be
shown by acts and conduct and sometimes by nonaction.").
46. 411 U.S. at 282-84.
47. Parden v. Terminal Ry. Co., 377 U.S. 184, 185 (1964).
48. 411 U.S. at 284.
49. Id. at 283.
50. Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938, ch. 676, § 3(d), 52 Stat. 1060 (1938), as amended
by Fair Labor Standards Act of 1966, Pub. L. No. 89-601,80 Stat. 830 (1966). The original
FLSA excluded federal, state and local governmental bodies from the definition of "employers." The 1966 amendments added an exceptions clause to § 3(d) which read: "except with respect to employees of a State, or a political subdivision thereof, employed (1)
in a hospital, institution, or school referred to in subsection (r) of this section." Subsection (r) further defined hospitals, institutions and schools.
51. See Employees, 411 U.S. at 284-85. Section 16(b) of the FLSA authorized suit in
federal district court against an "employer" to recover overtime compensation, liquidated
damages and attorney's fees. When Congress expanded the definition of employer in
§ 3(d) in 1966 to include certain state operations, it left the grant ofjurisdiction in § 16(b)
unchanged.

1988]

ELEVENTH AMENDMENT

in Parden, was not without its difficulties. As was readily apparent, Congress had been much clearer in the FLSA than it had been in the FELA
about its intent to "[bring] the states to heel."'5 2 The FELA was silent
about suits against states in federal court, and no one suggested that
Congress had even thought about the matter. 53 It was really only coincidental that the state of Alabama operated an interstate railroad, and
Congress, twenty years earlier, had decided to authorize suits under the
FELA against interstate railroads. By contrast, Congress explicitly addressed the question of applicability to state entities in its 1966 amendments to the FLSA, by modifying the definition of "employer" to
include specified state institutions, such as state hospitals. 54 It is therefore difficult to understand how Justice Douglas thought Congress had
not made its intent clear enough in the FLSA, when Parden had found
the FELA to be sufficiently clear without any evidence of congressional
intent. Indeed, Justices Marshall and Brennan in concurring and dissenting opinions found Justice Douglas' argument that Congress had
55
not been clear enough in the FLSA nothing short of incredible.
A second problem with Justice Douglas' opinion concerned the conclusion implicit in his analysis of congressional intent that Congress, had
it been clear enough, could have subjected states to suits under the
FLSA even without state consent. 5 6 Given his assumption that Hans
52. Employees, 411 U.S. at 283.
53. The legislative history of the FELA discloses no congressional consideration of
the potential liability of states engaged in interstate railroad operations. Rather, the debate focused on whether the legislation would unconstitutionally intrude on states' exercise of police power over intrastate commerce. See, e.g., 42 CONG. REC. 4438 (1908).
54. Fair Labor Standards Amendments of 1966, Pub. L. No. 89-601, Title II, § 102(b),
80 Stat. 831 (codified at 29 U.S.C. § 203(d) (1982)).
55. Justice Marshall said: "In the face of such clear language, I find it impossible to
believe that Congress did not intend to extend theffull benefit of the provisions of the FLSA
to these state employees." Employees, 411 U.S. at 289 (Marshall, J. concurring). Justice
Brennan found "no support whatever in either the text of the amendments or their legislative history for the arguments made by the Court for its contrary conclusion." Id. at 303
(Brennan, J., dissenting).
It would be possible to attribute untoward motives to Justice Douglas. He was one of
the dissenters in Parden, arguing that Congress had not made sufficiently clear in the FELA
its intent to permit suits against states in federal court. One possibility, therefore, is that
he was silently overruling Parden in Employees. His dissent in Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S.
651 (1974), however, suggests otherwise.
In Edelman Justice Douglas accepted the Parden rationale that Alabama had constructively consented to suit by entering the interstate railroad business twenty years after enactment of the FELA. He found constructive consent present in Edelman as well, based on
Illinois' decision to enter into a federal-state welfare plan heavily regulated by Congress.
While Justice Douglas' Edelman dissent did not refer to his majority opinion in Employees, it
is fair to assume that he was more concerned about the degree of congressional authorization in Employees than he was in Edelman because there was no basis for finding state consent in Employees. In order to permit suit in Employees, Justice Douglas would have been
required to assume that Congress intended to subject states to suits in federal court without their consent. He was not willing to make that assumption without more evidence. 411
U.S. at 284-85.
56. Congress was quick to adopt Justice Douglas' suggestion. It amended the jurisdictional provisions of the FLSA within two years after Employees, explicitly authorizing suits
against states. Fair Labor Standards Amendments of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-259, § 6(d)(l),
88 Stat. 55 (1974) (codified at 29 U.S.C. § 216(b) (1982)). Additionally, the 1974 amendments broadened the definition of employer to include any "public agency." The 1974
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read into the eleventh amendment a constitutional barrier to suits
against states in federal court, how could Congress remove that barrier
by statute? Justice Marshall's concurring opinion addressed both of
these problems with Justice Douglas' opinion, but left other problems
unresolved.
2.

Justice Marshall's Concurring Opinion

Justice Marshall asserted that there were two distinct questions
raised by Employees: first, whether Congress, by extending the FLSA to
certain state employees, had abrogated the states' affirmative defense of
common law sovereign immunity; and second, whether this exercise
of
57
federal judicial power was barred by the eleventh amendment.
On the first question, Justice Marshall concluded that Congress had
intentionally and effectively abrogated the defense of common law sovereign immunity by using its commerce power to enact the FLSA which,
by its terms, authorized suits against states. 58 He therefore disagreed
with the Court's more cautious reading of congressional intent.
Justice Marshall based his concurrence in the judgment of the Court
on his answer to the second question. Emphasizing notions of federalism and state sovereignty, Justice Marshall concluded that the eleventh
amendment barred suits against states in federal court by citizens as well
as noncitizens. 59 The suit against Alabama in Parden had been allowed
to proceed, injustice Marshall's eyes, because Alabama had waived eleventh amendment immunity by entering into the interstate railroad business with full knowledge that it would thereby subject itself to federal
regulations like the FELA. He asserted that no waiver had occurred in
Employees, because Missouri had been running state mental hospitals
long before Congress amended the FLSA to bring them under its coverage. 60 Because he believed the eleventh amendment raised a constitutionally imposed jurisdictional barrier to suit in federal court, he
concluded that, regardless of congressional intent to the contrary, the
plaintiffs in Employees could not bring suit in federal court. 6 1
Although Justice Marshall's concurring opinion resolved the obvious problems with the Court's opinion, it exposed other difficulties that
could not be so easily resolved. For example, if the eleventh amendamendments were held unconstitutional in National League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S.
833 (1976), although on tenth rather than eleventh amendment grounds. National League of
Cities was itself overruled nine years later in Garcia v. San Antonio Metropolitan Transit
Auth., 469 U.S. 528 (1985).
57. Id. at 287-88 (Marshall, J., concurring).
58. Id. at 288-89 (Marshall, J., concurring).
59. Id. at 294 (Marshall, J., concurring).
60. Id. at 296 (Marshall, J., concurring).
61. Id. at 289 (Marshall,J., concurring). Citing Testa v. Katt, 330 U.S. 386 (1947) and
General Oil v. Crain, 209 U.S. 211 (1908), Justice Marshall concluded that the the state
courts would be constitutionally obligated under the supremacy clause to enforce FLSA
claims, common law sovereign immunity to the contrary notwithstanding. 411 U.S. at 298
(Marshall, J., concurring). Justice Douglas, by contrast, noted that state courts might be
available for FLSA suits, but declined to decide whether they were obligated to hear them.
Id. at 287.
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ment imposes a constitutionally dictated jurisdictional barrier to suits
against states in federal court which Congress cannot overcome by legislation, how can states confer jurisdiction on the federal courts by mere
consent? What of the black letter rule learned by every first year law
student that consent of the parties does not confer subject matter jurisdiction? 62 Justice Marshall's only response to that question was that the
ability of a state to waive the jurisdictional bar of the eleventh amendment by consent "is an anomaly that is well established as a part of our
constitutional jurisprudence." ' 63 While correct as far as it goes, this
statement is hardly a satisfactory basis for constitutional decision
making. 64
3.

Justice Brennan's Dissent

Justice Brennan criticized both Justice Douglas and Justice Marshall
for what he felt was a misunderstanding of his Parden opinion. In explaining what he meant in Parden, Justice Brennan also provided answers
to key problems raised by the opinions ofJustices Douglas and Marshall.
Justice Brennan took the position that Parden had held the eleventh
amendment inapplicable to citizen suits. As a result, Missouri's immunity defense would have to rest on the common law doctrine of sovereign immunity. However, he reiterated his view that the states had
surrendered a portion of their sovereignty to Congress by ratifying the
commerce clause. Congress, he felt, had authorized suit against Missouri by enacting the FLSA pursuant to its commerce power. This left
65
no immunity on which Missouri could rely in defense of this lawsuit.

By taking the position that the eleventh amendment does not apply
to citizen suits, Justice Brennan accomplished two things. First, he resolved the problem presented by Justice Douglas' opinion of how Congress could by statute override a constitutionally imposed immunity.
Second, he avoided the anomaly of permitting subject matter jurisdiction to be conferred on the federal courts by consent of the states.
The biggest problem with Justice Brennan's dissent is his insistence
that Parden held the eleventh amendment inapplicable to citizen suits.
Without the benefit of Justice Brennan's Employees dissent, few persons
reading the majority opinion in Parden would have guessed as much. In
62. See

J.

M. KANE & A. MILLER, CIVIL PROCEDURE 13 (1985); C.
7, at 23 (4th ed. 1983).
63. 411 U.S. at 294-95 n.10 (Marshall, J., concurring).
64. Another conceptual problem not resolved by the approaches taken by Justices
Douglas and Marshall concerns the Supreme Court's appellate jurisdiction over the state
courts. The eleventh amendment does not distinguish between appellate and original jurisdiction. Thus it literally applies not only to suits against states brought originally in the
federal district courts but also to suits against states brought in the state courts and appealed to the Supreme Court. However, the power of the Supreme Court to hear such
appeals has never been seriously questioned, in spite of the eleventh amendment. See, e.g.,
General Oil v. Crain, 209 U.S. 211 (1908) (exercise of appellate jurisdiction to determine
whether state courts were obligated by supremacy clause to hear suits that might be barred
in federal court by the eleventh amendment).
65. 411 U.S. at 321 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
FRIEDENTHAL,

WRIGHT, LAW OF FEDERAL COURTS §
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Parden, he stated: "Although the Eleventh Amendment is not in terms
applicable here, since petitioners are citizens of Alabama, this Court has
recognized that an unconsenting State is immune from federal-court suits
by its own citizens as well as by citizens of another State."'6 6 In retrospect Justice Brennan probably meant that, although the eleventh amendment did not apply to citizen suits, states could nevertheless raise the
defense of common law sovereign immunity even without state consent or
congressional authorization. But no other Justice participating in the
Employees decision was willing to read Parden that way.
C.

Edelman v. Jordan

Edelman v. Jordan6 7 was a class action on behalf of Illinois disability
benefit applicants against the state officials administering federal-state
programs of Aid to the Aged, Blind, and Disabled (AABD). 68 Plaintiffs
alleged that the processing of their benefit applications by the defendant
officials exceeded the maximum time periods authorized by federal law.
They sought a preliminary injunction requiring defendants to comply
with federal standards. They also requested a permanent injunction requiring defendants to provide restitution to plaintiffs for benefits with69
held by the state as a result of past noncompliance with federal law.
The Court granted the first request but denied the second. Justice
Rehnquist wrote the Court's opinion. This time Justices Douglas, Marshall and Brennan each dissented, albeit in three separate opinions. Justice Blackmun joined injustice Marshall's dissent to round out another
five-four split.

70

1. Justice Rehnquist's Majority Opinion
Insofar as the plaintiffs sought prospective injunctive relief against
Illinois state officials to compel their compliance with federal law, Justice
Rehnquist saw no difficulty with permitting the suit under Exparte Young.
However, Justice Rehnquist rejected plaintiff's argument that Ex Parte
Young permitted an award of back benefits. 7 1 He concluded that the
award of back benefits, although couched in terms of equitable restitution, nevertheless constituted a monetary award against the state of Illi72
nois barred by the eleventh amendment.
66. Parden v. Terminal Ry. Co., 377 U.S. 184, 186 (1964) (citing Hans v. Louisiana,
134 U.S. I (1890)) (emphasis added). Justice Rehnquist used virtually identical language
in Edelman, stating that "[wihile the Amendment by its terms does not bar suits against a
State by itsown citizens, this Court has consistently held that an unconsenting State is
immune from suits brought in federal courts by her own citizens as well as by citizens of
another State." Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 662-63 (1974).
67. 415 U.S. 651 (1974).
68. Social Security Amendments of 1972, Pub. L.No. 92-603, Title III, 86 Stat. 1465
(codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 1381-1383c (1982)).
69. 415 U.S. at 656.
70. Id. at 678 (Douglas, J., dissenting); id. at 687 (Brennan, J., dissenting); id.at 688
(Marshall,J., dissenting).
71. Id.at 664.
72. Id. at 666.
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Justice Rehnquist rejected the argument that Parden permitted an
award of back benefits because Illinois had waived its immunity from
suit in federal court by accepting matching federal funds under the provisions of the Social Security Act. 73 He noted that "[c]onstructive consent is not a doctrine commonly associated with the surrender of
constitutional rights." 74 He concluded that a state can only be found to
have waived its eleventh amendment immunity from suit in federal court
75
when the waiver is stated in "the most express language."1
Justice Rehnquist found further support for his conclusion in the
failure of the Social Security Act to provide for enforcement suits
against states in federal court. The only sanction Congress provided in
the Social Security Act for the violation by participating states of its fund
76
distribution requirements was termination of future federal funding.
He noted, by contrast, that both Parden and Employees involved federal
legislation "which by its terms authorized suit ...

against a general class

of defendants which literally included States or state instrumentalities."' 77 The state was literally included in a class of defendants against
whom suit was authorized in Parden by operating interstate railroads,
and in Employees, by operating mental hospitals.
Justice Rehnquist rejected the argument that the Civil Rights Act of
1871 (section 1983)78 authorized this suit to bring Illinois into compliance with the Social Security Act. He noted that section 1983 did nothing more than authorize an action against state officials, such as
plaintiffs' claim for prospective injunctive relief which the Court found
was permitted by Ex parte Young. In Justice Rehnquist's view, that hardly
constituted congressional authorization to sue the state itself, let alone a
79
general class of defendants that literally included states.
73. Id. at 671. The court of appeals had stated this as an alternative basis for its
decision.
74. Id. at 673.
75. "[W]e will find waiver only where stated 'by the most express language or by such
overwhelming implications from the text as will leave no room for any other reasonable
construction.' " Id. (quoting Murray v. Wilson Distilling Co., 213 U.S. 151, 171 (1909)).
76. 42 U.S.C. § 1384 (1970) (omitted by revision, Pub. L. No. 92-603, § 302, 86 Stat
1465 (1982)).
77. 415 U.S. at 672.
78. The Civil Rights Act of 1871, ch. 22, § 1, 17 Stat. 13 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1983
(1982), states in part:

Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom,
or usage, of any State . . . subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the
United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of
any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall
be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper
proceeding for redress.
79. Justice Rehnquist was probably following the Court's reasoning in the seminal
decision of Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167 (1961). Monroe held that the word "person" in
§ 1983 encompasses natural persons but not municipalities. Id. at 187. By the same logic,
§ 1983 could be viewed as authorizing suits against state officials but not against the state
itself.
After Edelman was decided, this aspect of Monroe was overruled in Monell v. Department of Social Serv., 436 U.S. 658 (1978). In Quern v. Jordan, 440 U.S. 332 (1979), a
continuation of the Edelman litigation under a different name, the Court concluded in dictum that the lonell reading of § 1983 to encompass suits against municipalities would not
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One problem immediately raised by Justice Rehnquist's opinion in
Edelman concerns his apparent reinterpretation of the Parden decision.
In Employees, Justice Douglas had stated that the Parden decision was
based on the doctrine of waiver.8 0 However, Justice Rehnquist seemed
to suggest that Parden was really based on the doctrine of congressional
authorization. Furthermore, Justice Rehnquist said that congressional
authorization was present in both Parden and Employees, once again raising the question of why that authorization was sufficient in Parden and
not in Employees.
A related problem raised by Justice Rehnquist's opinion concerns
his statement that constructive consent could not be the basis of an eleventh amendment waiver. The Parden Court based its decision, at least in
part, on the issue of constructive consent. 8 1 Justice Douglas' opinion in
Employees referred to Parden as a consent case. While this seeming inconsistency with Parden might explain why Justice Rehnquist sought to characterize Parden as a congressional authorization case, that
recharacterization served only to emphasize the incongruence between
Parden and Employees.
2.

Justice Douglas' Dissent

In his majority opinion in Employees, Justice Douglas had distinguished Parden from Employees on the basis of consent. He now asserted
that Edelman was distinguishable from Employees on the same basis. He
found consent in Illinois' acceptance of matching federal funds to support its AABD program, coupled with knowledge of Supreme Court precedent authorizing monetary awards against states not complying with
federal guidelines for administration of AABD programs.8 2 He was satisfied that section 1983 provided the appropriate vehicle for such
awards.
Justice Douglas was not concerned about the lack of explicit congressional authorization, as he had been in Employees, because in
Edelman, unlike Employees, he felt that the state had consented to suit. 8 3

This also explains why Justice Douglas required Congress to use more
explicit language in Employees than had previously been required in
Parden. Parden, like Edelman, involved state consent, and therefore explicit congressional authorization was not necessary.
change the outcome of Edelman. The Quern dictum was reaffirmed without further discus-

sion in Green v. Mansour, 474 U.S. 64, 70 (1985).
80. Employees, 411 U.S. 279, 282 (1973).
81. Parden could not have been based on express consent. Alabama hotly contested
whether plaintiff could subject it to suit in federal court, and nothing in Alabama law suggested that Alabama had consented to this suit. Thus the only kind of consent that could
have been found in Parden was constructive consent. See Parden v. Terminal Ry. Co., 377
U.S. 184 (1964).
82. Edelman, 415 U.S. at 686-87 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
83. Id. (DouglasJ., dissenting).
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Justice Marshall's Dissent

Justice Marshall, joined by Justice Blackmun, agreed that Illinois
had waived its immunity from suit by accepting federal funds in support
of its AABD program. Justice Marshall argued that, by accepting federal
matching funds, Illinois had agreed to abide by the requirements imposed by the Social Security Act and accompanying regulations regarding their administration. Like Justice Douglas, he was untroubled by the
lack of authority in the Social Security Act for suits against states to enforce compliance with federal requirements, because he found that authority in section 1983. While conceding Justice Rehnquist's point that
section 1983 did not literally authorize suits against states, Justice Marshall noted that the Edelman class action was not literally a suit against a
state. It was a suit against state officials, and in that sense, had been
literally authorized by Congress. In the face of what he viewed as congressional authorization of a suit to which Illinois had constructively
consented by its acceptance of federal matching funds, Justice Marshall
found no eleventh amendment bar. He further noted that his views
were consistent with his position in Employees because there had been no
basis in Employees for inferring that Missouri had consented to the terms
84
of the FLSA.
4.

Justice Brennan's Dissent

Justice Brennan again asserted that the eleventh amendment does
not apply to citizen suits. He contended that the only immunity from
citizen suits which states could claim was the "ancient doctrine of sovereign immunity," which the states had surrendered by the grant of enumerated powers to Congress in the Constitution. In his view, since the
states gave up their immunity when the Constitution was ratified in
1789, there was no reason to inquire whether Congress intended to authorize suits against states for retroactive AABD benefits, or whether Illinois had consented to such suits by its acceptance of federal funds in
8 5
support of its AABD program.
D.

Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer

Fitzpatrick 86 was a Title VII sex discrimination suit by a class of current and retired male employees of the state of Connecticut against supervisory state officials. The class sought retroactive retirement
benefits. 8 7 As it had in the FLSA, Congress specifically excluded state
employers from coverage when it initially enacted Title VII, but subsequently amended the definitional provisions to bring states within the
purview of the statutory scheme.8 8 This time, acting pursuant to its
84.
85.
86.
87.

Id. at 694-95 (Marshall, J.,
dissenting).
Id. at 688 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 427 U.S. 445 (1976).
Id. at 449-50.

88. As originally enacted, the term "employer" was defined to exclude "the United
States, a corporation wholly owned by the Government of the United States, an Indian
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fourteenth amendment enforcement power, Congress included jurisdictional language ever so slightly more explicit than the language which
89
was found to be insufficient in Employees.
Fitzpatrick was a unanimous opinion authored by Justice Rehnquist. 90 It was the first and only modern eleventh amendment case to be
decided without dissent. 9 1 The only hint of disagreement on the Court
appeared in brief concurring opinions written by Justices Brennan and
92
Stevens.
As in Edelman, to the extent plaintiffs sought prospective injunctive
relief against the individual state officials they had named as defendants,
the suit was permitted by Ex parte Young. This time, however, Justice
Rehnquist found that an award of back benefits from the Connecticut
state treasury was also permissible in spite of the eleventh
93
amendment.
1. Justice Rehnquist's Majority Opinion
In his discussion of the eleventh amendment implications of a retroactive monetary award against the state, Justice Rehnquist observed
that, unlike Edelman, "in this Title VII case, the 'threshold fact of contribe, or a State or political subdivision thereof .. " Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No.
88-352, § 701(b), 78 Stat. 253 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b) (1982)).
89. The claim in Employees was brought under the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938.
Section 3(d) of the FLSA originally defined "employer" to exclude states and political
subdivisions. This definition was amended in 1966 to except from the exclusion "employees of a state, or a political subdivision thereof, employed ... in a hospital, institution, or
school." 29 U.S.C. § 203(d) (1982). However, § 16(b) of the act, which granted jurisdiction to the federal courts to enforce the provisions of the FLSA, was not amended to
include any specific reference to this expanded definition of "employer." 29 U.S.C.
§ 216(b) (1982). The court held that it would not infer congressional intent to abrogate
immunity from suit in the absence of an amendment to § 16(b).
The claim in Fitzpatrick was brought under the Civil Rights Act of 1964. As with the
FLSA, the Civil Rights Act originally excluded states, but was later amended to include
governments, their agencies and political subdivisions. Equal Employment Opportunity
Act of 1972, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(a) (Supp. IV 1970). The crucial difference was that the
enforcement provisions of the Civil Rights Act were also amended to make clear that the
right of private enforcement was being extended to individuals aggrieved by public employers. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-5(a) to (g) (Supp. IV 1970). Subsection (f)(1) states in
part:
In the case of a respondent which is a government, governmental agency, or
political subdivision, if the Commission has been unable to secure from the respondent a conciliation agreement acceptable to the Commission, the Commission shall . . . refer the case to the Attorney General who may bring a civil action
against such respondent in the appropriate United States district court. The person or persons aggrieved shall have the right to intervene in a civil action brought
by the Commission or the Attorney General in a case involving a government,
governmental agency, or political subdivision.
90. 427 U.S. 445 (1976).
91. Other eleventh amendment cases decided by a split vote include Green v. Mansour, 474 U.S. 64 (1985) (five-four); County of Oneida v. Oneida Indian Nation, 470 U.S.
226 (1985) (six-three); Pennhurst State School & Hosp. v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89 (1984)
(five-four); Cory v. White, 457 U.S. 85 (1982) (six-three); Hutto v. Finney, 437 U.S. 678
(1978) (six-three); Edelman v.Jordan, 415 U.S. 651 (1974) (five-four); Employees, 411 U.S.
279 (1973) (six joining in Court's opinion, two concurring in the judgment only, and one
dissent); Parden v. Terminal Ry., 377 U.S. 184 (1964) (five-four).
92. 427 U.S. at 457 (Brennan, J., concurring); id. at 458-60 (Stevens,J., concurring).
93. Id. at 457.
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gressional authorization' .. to sue the State as employer is clearly present."'9 4 He added that "[t]his is, of course, the prerequisite found
present in Parden and wanting in Employees." 9 5 Justice Rehnquist noted
that Parden involved authorization based on Congress's commerce
power, while Fitzpatrick was based on Congress's fourteenth amendment
96
enforcement power. However, he found such a distinction unavailing.
After all, the fourteenth amendment was aimed specifically at states and
their treatment of private citizens, and section five of the fourteenth
amendment gave Congress express authority to enforce the provisions
of the fourteenth amendment "by appropriate legislation." ' 9 7 Justice

Rehnquist concluded that the eleventh amendment, and the principles
of state sovereignty embodied therein, were "necessarily limited by the
enforcement provisions of § 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment." 98 Congress had acted pursuant to the fourteenth amendment, and was therefore capable of authorizing this suit.
The primary difficulty with Justice Rehnquist's opinion in Fitzpatrick
concerns its starting point. First of all, Justice Rehnquist had unequivocally stated in Edelman that "[b]oth Parden and Employees involved a congressional enactment which by its terms authorized suit . . . against a

general class of defendants which literally included States." 99 Yet here
he contended that congressional authorization was "found present in
Parden and wanting in Employees."' 00
Second, Justice Rehnquist's Fitzpatrick opinion renewed the confusion created in Employees about the degree of specificity required by Congress in order to overcome the eleventh amendment. On whatever scale
of sufficiency the Court used to measure congressional authorization,

why was authorization insufficient in Employees but sufficient in Fitzpatrick
and Parden? Regarding the legislation at issue, Congress had been fairly
specific about regulating state activities in Employees, slightly more specific in Fitzpatrick, and utterly silent in Parden.
2.

The Concurring Opinions

Neither Justice Brennan's nor Justice Stevens' concurring opinion
addressed these difficulties. Justice Brennan merely reiterated his view
that the eleventh amendment did not apply to suits brought by citizens
against their own state.' 0 Justice Stevens acknowledged the plausibility
10 2
ofJustice Brennan's position and agreed with his result.
94.
95.
96.
97.
98.
99.

Id. at 452 (quoting Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 672 (1974)).
Id.
Id. at 452-53.
U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 5.
Fitzpatrick, 427 U.S. at 456.
Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 652, 672 (1974).

100. 427 U.S. at 452.
101. Id. at 457 (Brennan,J., concurring).
102. Id. at 458 (Stevens,J., concurring). Justice Stevens commented that "[e]ven if the
Eleventh Amendment does cover a citizen's suit against his own State, it does not bar an
action against state officers enforcing an invalid statute." Id. at 458-59 (Stevens,J., concurring) (citing Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 264 (1821)

and Employees, 411 U.S.
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The Problems Summarized

The problems created by the Supreme Court's view of the eleventh
amendment in Parden through Fitzpatrick can be divided into two categories. The first relates to the Court's conception of the eleventh amendment as a constitutional barrier to both citizen and noncitizen suits
against states in federal court. The second relates to the analytical bases
for the distinctions drawn in its eleventh amendment decisions.
The Court's conception of the eleventh amendment poses three
principal dilemmas for the Court. First, it requires the Court to ignore
the literal language of the eleventh amendment. Second, it creates serious problems for the Court in explaining how the eleventh amendment's jurisdictional barrier may be waived by the decision of individual
states to consent to suits against them in federal court. Third, it leaves
unanswered the question of how Congress can abrogate the eleventh
amendment merely by enacting a statute authorizing suits against states.
The analytical difficulties with the Court's precedent concern the
degree of state consent or congressional authorization needed to avoid
eleventh amendment problems, and the relationship between state consent and congressional authorization. Are both consent and authorization necessary, or will one suffice? If the authorization in Parden was
sufficient, why was the authorization in Employees insufficient, and what
made the authorization in Fitzpatrick sufficient? If constructive consent
supported the suit in Parden, why did Justice Rehnquist say in Edelman
that eleventh amendment immunity could not be waived by constructive
consent?
II.

THE CASES RECONCILED WITH EACH OTHER AND WITH A MORE
LITERAL VIEW OF THE ELEVENTH AMENDMENT

The Court's conception of the eleventh amendment is rooted firmly
in its decision in Hans v. Louisiana that the drafters of the eleventh
amendment could not have intended to bar federal suits against states
by noncitizens while simultaneously permitting citizen suits. However, a
narrower and more literal reading of the eleventh has been suggested by
two commentators, Professors Field and Fletcher.10 3 The interpretation
of the eleventh amendment that follows is based largely on their ideas.
A.

Did the Drafters of the Eleventh Amendment Mean What They Said?
In order to understand why the eleventh amendment was drafted as

279, 298 (1973) (Brennan,J., dissenting) for the proposition that the eleventh amendment
does not apply to citizen suits). Justice Stevens based his conclusion on the Ex Parte Young
fiction that suits to enjoin state officials from enforcing unconstitutional state statutes are
not suits against the state for eleventh amendment purposes. He acknowledged that
Edelman forbids the application of Ex Parte Young to cases where funds are sought directly
from the state treasury. He asserted, however, that Edelman did not apply where the award
would be paid directly out of trust assets which would only later be replenished from state
treasury funds. Id. at 459-60.
103.

Field, Part One, supra note 1; Field, Part Two, supra note 1; Fletcher, supra note 1.
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it was, it is necessary to examine the problem the eleventh amendment
was designed to address, which is universally agreed to be the Supreme
Court's decision in Chisolm v. Georgia.10 4 Understanding the full significance of the problem Chisolm posed requires analysis of the various
grants of judicial power found in article III, section 2, of the
Constitution.
1. The Constitution's Grant of Power to the Third Branch
Article III, section 2, of the Constitution lists a number of different
bases for the exercise of federal judicial power, but they can all be categorized under one of two headings: party-based or subject-based jurisdiction. 10 5 For purposes of eleventh amendment analysis two clauses
are of paramount importance: the "arising under" clause, and the
"state-noncitizen" clause. The arising under clause, the principal subject-based jurisdictional grant, extends the judicial power of the United
States to cases "arising under this Constitution, the Laws of the United
States, and Treaties made, or which shall be made, under their Authority. "106 The state-noncitizen clause, one of several party-based jurisdictional grants, extends federal judicial power to controversies "between a
07
State and Citizens of another State."i
The potential ramifications of the state-noncitizen clause were not
debated during the Constitutional Convention. However, there was
considerable debate during state ratifying conventions over the question
of whether the state-noncitizen clause would partially abrogate state sovereign immunity by permitting states to be sued in federal court by citizens of other states. 10 8 While it is not possible to draw from these
debates firm conclusions about the intent of the framers, there is support for the view that neither the state-noncitizen clause nor any other
clause in article III, section 2, was intended to have such an effect. 1 9
2.

The Court's First Mistake: The Problem Presented by Chisolm
v. Georgia

Whatever the intent of the framers of the Constitution, the
Supreme Court in Chisolm v. Georgia decided that the state-noncitizen
clause did abrogate state sovereign immunity.I 1 0 This sent the nation,
in the words of one commentator, into "profound shock," and was the
104. 2 u.s. (2 Dall.) 419 (1793). See Field, Part One, supra note 1,at 515; Fletcher, supra
note 1, at 1034; Jacobs, supra note 1, at 64-67; Redish, supra note 1,at 140.
105. Party-based jurisdiction refers to those clauses in article III, section two, which
base jurisdiction on the status of the parties. Examples include the diversity of citizenship
clause and the clause granting jurisdiction in suits involving ambassadors, public ministers
and consuls. By contrast, subject-based jurisdiction refers to those clauses which base
jurisdiction on the subject matter of the litigation. This includes the clause granting jurisdiction in admiralty and maritime cases.
106. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl.1.
107. Id.
108. Fletcher, supra note 1,at 1046-53; Field, Part One, supra note 1, at 527-31.
109. Fletcher, supra note 1, at 1049, 1054; Field, Part One, supra note I, at 527-29.
110. 2 U.S. (2 Dail.) 419 (1793).
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catalyst for the proposal and ratification of the eleventh amendment. III
Chisolm was a common law action for breach of contract. 1 2 Since it
did not meet any of the requirements for subject-based jurisdiction, it
would normally have been brought in state court. And, of course, in
state court, Chisolm would have faced the common law defense of sovereign immunity. But since Chisolm was not a citizen of the state he
sued, he brought his suit in the original jurisdiction of the Supreme
Court, asserting that his claim could be heard there by reason of the
state-noncitizen clause.' 1 3 The "mistake" made in Chisolm was in the
Court's conclusion, based on ambiguous evidence in the ratification debates, that this conferral of federal subject matter jurisdiction partially
abrogated the common law doctrine of sovereign immunity.' 14
3.

The Cure: The Eleventh Amendment

The response to Chisolm v. Georgia was immediate. One day after
Chisolm was announced the following amendment to the Constitution
was proposed:
That no state shall be liable to be made a party defendant in
any of the judicial courts, established, or which shall be established under the authority of the United States, at the suit of
any person or persons whether a citizen or citizens, or a foreigner or foreigners, of any body politic
or corporate, whether
5
within or without the United States."l
One day later, a different amendment was proposed:
The Judicial power of the United States shall not extend to any
suits in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted against one of
the United States by citizens of another state, or by citizens or
1
subjects of any foreign state. 16
111. C. WARREN, 1 THE SUPREME COURT IN UNITED STATES HISTORY 96 (rev. ed. 1932).
Professor Warren reports that there was considerable fear that Chisolm would encourage
raids on meager state treasuries through suits against states in federal court brought "by
holders of State issues of paper and other credits, or by Loyalist refugees to recover property confiscated or sequestered by the States." The Georgia House of Representatives
immediately enacted a statute making any attempt to execute process in the Chisolm case a
capital felony, punishable by "death, without benefit of clergy, by being hanged." Id. at
100.
The "profound shock" theory of the eleventh amendment does not stand undisputed.
Judge Gibbons has suggested the eleventh amendment was more a reaction to "foreign
policy concerns and political compromises of the Federalist era" than outrage at the
Court's attempt to undermine sovereign immunity. Gibbons, supra note 1, at 1894.
112. 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) at 419.
113. Id. at 420-21.
114. Justice Iredell, dissenting in Chisolm, asserted that the state-noncitizen clause did
not abrogate common law sovereign immunity. He argued that jurisdiction under article
III could be exercised only to the extent legislatively authorized, and that, by permitting
the issuance of writs "agreeable to the principles and usages of law," Congress had not
intended to alter the common law principle that the sovereign could not be sued without
consent. 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) at 433-34 (Iredell, J.,dissenting) (quoting Judiciary Act of 1789,
ch. 20, § 14, 1 Stat. 73, 81).
115. Fletcher, supra note 1,at 1058-59 (quoting Pa. J. & Weekly Advertiser, Feb. 27,
1793, at 1, col. 2).
116. Fletcher, supra note 1,at 1059 (quoting 3 ANNALS OF CONG. 651-52 (1793)).
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This proposal, with three words added to it, and one word changed
from plural to singular, became the eventual text of the eleventh
amendment:
The Judicial power of the United States shall not be construed to
extend to any suit[s] in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted against one of the United States by citizens of another
17
state, or by citizens or subjects of any foreign state.'
Whatever else might be said about the intent of the drafters of the
eleventh amendment, it should be clear by comparing the first proposed
amendment to the one eventually adopted that the decision to focus the
eleventh amendment on noncitizen suits was not inadvertent. However,
when the Supreme Court decided Hans v. Louisiana118 approximately
one century later, it seemed to take a different view of the matter.
4.

The Court's Second Mistake: What Was Wrong with
Hans v. Louisiana

Hans, like Chisolm, was a suit for breach of contract brought against a
state in federal court. The major difference was that Hans was a citizen
of the state he sued. Consequently he could not rely on the state-noncitizen clause as a basis for subject matter jurisdiction.' l 9 Instead, Hans
asserted a claim against Louisiana under the contract clause of the
United States Constitution,' 20 relying on the arising under clause of article III as the basis for federal subject matter jurisdiction. 12 '
The Hans Court asked whether the drafters of the eleventh amendment meant to forbid suits against a state by citizens of other states
while permitting such suits by its own citizens. 122 The Court concluded
that the drafters could not have intended such an odd result,' 2 3 and the
eleventh amendment has been in trouble ever since. Whether the Court
in Hans meant to constitutionalize state immunity from citizen suits or
simply to recognize a common law analogue to the eleventh amendment
117.

Fletcher, supra note 1, at 1059 (quoting 4 ANNALS OF CONG. 25 (1794)).

Emphasis

indicates words added to the previous version, while brackets indicate that the letter "s"
was deleted from the previous version.
118. 134 U.S. 1 (1890).
119. Id. at 9-10.
120. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, cl. 1 states: "No State shall ... pass any ... law impairing
the obligation of contracts .... "
121. The arising under jurisdiction of the lower federal courts was implemented by
Congress in the Act of March 3, 1875, ch. 137, § 1, 18 Stat. 470 (codified as amended at 28
U.S.C. § 1331 (1982)).
122. 134 U.S. at 15.
123. The Court in Hans said:
Can we suppose that, when the Eleventh Amendment was adopted, it was understood to be left open for citizens of a State to sue their own state in the federal
courts, whilst the idea of suits by citizens of other states, or of foreign states, was
indignantly repelled? Suppose that Congress, when proposing the Eleventh
Amendment, had appended to it a proviso that nothing therein contained should
prevent a State from being sued by its own citizens in cases arising under the
Constitution or laws of the United States: can we imagine that it would have been
adopted by the States? The supposition that it would is almost an absurdity on its
face.
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bar against noncitizen suits, 1 2 4 the Court in subsequent cases has interpreted Hans as recognizing in the eleventh amendment a constitutional
12 5
immunity of states from citizen and noncitizen suits in federal court.
A major portion of subsequent eleventh amendment jurisprudence has
been devoted to identifying and justifying exceptions to this immunity,
so that limitations on state power imposed by the Constitution or Congress could be enforced by private parties through litigation in the fed12 6
eral courts.
The Court might have laid a better foundation for future eleventh
amendment analysis had its focus in Hans been on why the drafters of
the eleventh amendment were unconcerned about citizen suits against
states, rather than on whether they intended to permit citizen suits. Answering this question is a crucial first step to unraveling the eleventh
amendment.
B.

The True Meaning of the Eleventh Amendment

Starting with the premise that the principal concern of the drafters
of the eleventh amendment was to correct the Supreme Court's misconstruction of article III in Chisolm,' 2 7 and viewing that premise against a
124. Justice Brennan has for some time contended that the conclusion of Hans v. Louisiana was based on nothing more than the common law doctrine of sovereign immunity.
Employees, 411 U.S. 279, 320-21 (1973). Professors Field and Fletcher both agree.
Fletcher, supra note 1, at 1039; Field, Part One, supra note 1, at 539 n.86. Until Atascadero,
the rest of the Court disagreed with Justice Brennan's interpretation. For example, in
Employees, Justice Marshall engaged in a vigorous footnote battle with Justice Brennan,
contending that Hans found in the spirit of the eleventh amendment a constitutional barrier to suits against states in federal court whether brought by citizens or noncitizens of the
state sued. 411 U.S. at 292 n.7 (Marshall, J., concurring); id. at 292-93 n.8 (Brennan, J.,
dissenting). In Atascadero, Justices Marshall, Stevens and Blackmun for the first time
agreed with Justice Brennan's reading of Hans. Atascadero State Hospital v. Scanlon, 473
U.S. 234, 247 (1985) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
125. See, e.g., Florida Dep't of State v. Treasure Salvors, Inc., 458 U.S. 670, 683 n.17
(1982); Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 662-63 (1974); Employees, 411 U.S. 279, 280
(1973).
126. This article chronicles the Supreme Court's struggle with the eleventh amendment since Hans. One can imagine how much more difficult has been the task of the lower
federal courts of interpreting and applying the Supreme Court's post-Hans decisions.
Compare United States v. Union Gas Co., 792 F.2d 372 (3d Cir. 1986) (private suit against
state under Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation and Liability Act
barred despite inclusion of states among "persons" liable under the Act) and Richard Anderson Photography v. Radford Univ., 633 F. Supp. 1154 (W.D. Va. 1986) (copyright infringement suit against state institution barred) with Clark v. Cohen, 794 F.2d 79 (3d Cir.
1986) (order directing expenditure of state funds to finance living arrangements for
mental health patient unconstitutionally confined in state institution not barred) and
Grotta v. Rhode Island, 781 F.2d 343 (1st Cir. 1986) (as consequence of state court interpretation of state statute as waiving eleventh amendment immunity, state is a "person"
subject to suit in federal court under 42 U.S.C. § 1983) and David D. v. Dartmouth School
Comm., 775 F.2d 411 (1st Cir. 1985) (suit against state entities under Education of the
Handicapped Act not barred) andJohnson v. University of Va., 606 F. Supp. 321 (W.D. Va.
1985) (copyright infringement suit against state institution not barred).
For a list of current federal statutes authorizing in some fashion citizen suits against
state entities, and therefore raising potential future eleventh amendment problems, see
McClintock, Downey, Karau & Kirkpatrick, The Atascadero Rule: New Hurdlefor Plaintiffs Suing States in Federal Court, 21 GoNz. L. REv. 47, 86-101 (1986).
127. In support of the point that it was primarily a matter of misconstruction the draft-
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backdrop of the other grants of judicial power found in article III, it is
readily apparent why the drafters focused solely on noncitizen suits.
The only clause in article III that had been misconstrued was the statenoncitizen clause. Furthermore, the only suits that threatened state sovereignty in federal court were noncitizen suits. Citizen suits posed no
similar danger. 1 28 If Chisolm had been a citizen of Georgia, then, regardless of sovereign immunity, his contract claim against Georgia
would not have been within the subject matter jurisdiction of the federal
courts. The drafters of the eleventh amendment addressed their only
immediate concern by providing that suits like Chisolm's could not be
29
heard by federal courts.1
This reading of the drafters' intent, while further justifying the conclusion that the otherwise odd wording of the eleventh amendment was
not inadvertent, raises two key questions. First, can a citizen sue her own
state in federal court when jurisdiction is based on the federal question
clause of article III? Second, if the answer to the first question is yes,
can a noncitizen also sue the state in federal court on a federal question
claim, thus avoiding reliance on the now maligned state-noncitizen
clause for jurisdiction?
The difficulties posed by these questions may be what prompted the
Supreme Court to approach Hans as it did. When Hans sued his home
state of Louisiana in federal court, basing jurisdiction on a federal question, the Supreme Court had to answer the first question. Furthermore,
the Court had to at least consider the implications an affirmative answer
would have for the second question. If a citizen could sue her state on a
federal question in federal court then perhaps a noncitizen could also
bring such a suit, even in the face of the eleventh amendment. Hans
avoided the implications posed by the second question by answering the
first question in the negative, concluding that, regardless of the basis for
subject matter jurisdiction, neither a citizen nor a noncitizen could sue a
30
state in federal court.1
There is, however, another way of approaching these questions that
both addresses the implications of the second question and permits a
ers were worried about, Professor Fletcher notes that the earliest draft of what ultimately
became the eleventh amendment provided that "[tihe Judicial power of the United States
shall not extend to any suits in law or equity .... Only later was the phrase "'be construed
to" added, so that eleventh amendment opened with the command that "[t]he Judicial
power of the United States shall not be construed to extend .
Fletcher, supra note i, at

1059-62 (emphasis added).
128. Citizen suits could not be brought under party-based jurisdiction. Therefore, the
only likely basis for jurisdiction in a citizen suit would have been federal question jurisdiction. Congress, however, did not authorize the exercise of federal question jurisdiction by
federal trial courts until 1875, Act of Mar. 3, 1875, ch. 137, 18 Stat. 470, save for a brief
period in 1801. Act of Feb. 13, 1801, ch. 4,2 Stat. 89, repealed by Act of Mar. 8, 1802, ch. 8,
2 Stat. 132.
129. As Professor Fletcher notes, "[u]nder this interpretation, the adopters of the
amendment were following the traditions of common law lawyers in solving only the problem in front of them by requiring a limiting construction of the state-diversity clause."
Fletcher, supra note i,at 1063.

130. 134 U.S. 1, 20 (1890).
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more literal interpretation of the eleventh amendment. This approach
rests on a premise first articulated several years ago by Professor Field
that the intent behind article III was to remain neutral on the question
of continued viability of the doctrine of common law sovereign immunity. 13 When the Constitution was written, debate on the sovereign
13 2
immunity question was limited to the state-noncitizen clause.
Although the views expressed about whether the clause abrogated sovereign immunity were mixed, no one suggested that the clause created a
new constitutional immunity. 13 3 Furthermore, if the state-noncitizen
clause was intended to be neutral on the question of sovereign immunity, as the reaction to Chisolm v. Georgia would suggest, then certainly
the same would have to be said for the rest of article III.
The conclusion that can be drawn from this premise is that the eleventh amendment was simply designed to restore the original intent of
article III by forbidding a construction of the state-noncitizen clause
hostile to common law sovereign immunity.1 34 In other words, the eleventh amendment does not impose a jurisdictional bar to noncitizen suits
in federal court. Rather, it forbids an interpretation of the article III
state-noncitizen clause that would permit such suits. The difference,
although subtle, can be seen most vividly by inserting six words into the
text of the eleventh amendment:
The Judicial power of the United States shall not be construed
to extend to any suit in law or equity, on the basis that it is commenced or prosecuted against one of the United States by Citizens of another State, or by Citizens or Subjects of any Foreign
35
State.'
131.
132.
133.

Field, Part One, supra note 1, at 538.
Field, Part One, supra note 1, at 527-36; Fletcher, supra note 1, at 1046-52.
Field, Part One, supra note 1, at 527-29; Fletcher, supra note 1, at 1049, 1054.

134. Field, Part One, supra note 1, at 538-39; Fletcher, supra note 1, at 1063.
135. The italicized words are those of the author, not Professor Field's. But the conclusions Professor Field reaches are consistent with the added language. She asserts that
[t]he provision that the 'U]udicial power of the United States shall not be construed to extend to' certain classes of cases may mean simply that the language
should not be deemed affirmatively to allow the prosecution of those cases, as it had
been deemed to do in Chisolm. The eleventh amendment then would simply overturn Chisolm's abrogation of sovereign immunity.
Field, Part One, supra note 1, at 543 (emphasis in original); Fletcher, supra note 1, at 1060-

61.
Professor Field's conclusions have not received unanimous acceptance. Professor
Fletcher points to the writings of several scholars critical of these conclusions, although he
accepts her central thesis. Fletcher, supra note 1, at 1036 n.9. The most serious criticism
of Professor Field's views comes from Professor Redish, who contends that neither historical evidence nor the language of the eleventh amendment supports her conclusions. Redish, supra note 1, at 148-49.
Regarding Professor Redish's view of the historical evidence, it should be noted that
there is no direct historical evidence supporting anyone's view of the drafters' intent in
proposing the eleventh amendment. As Professor Field notes, the amendment "passed
without debate, and contemporary indications of the intended scope of the amendment
are not available." Field, Part One, supra note 1, at 541. However, the alternative amendments proposed in response to Chisolm, as well as historical information concerning other
reactions to the Chisolm decision, permit some inferences to be made about the drafters'
intent. Fletcher, supra note 1, at 1058-59. That information, coupled with considerable
historical data concerning the intended scope of the state-noncitizen clause, provide ample
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Under this view of the eleventh amendment, the answers to the
questions faced by the Court in Hans are quite simple. Whether a state
may be sued by its citizens in federal court on a federal question claim
will depend on the nature of the claim and whether a common law sovereign immunity defense is available. This is so because article III permits the assertion of federal question jurisdiction but does not eradicate
the defense of common law sovereign immunity. 13 6 If a citizen can sue
his state in federal court on a particular federal question claim because
for whatever reason a sovereign immunity defense is not available, then
a noncitizen should also be accorded that right because the eleventh
amendment does not impose a jurisdictional bar to noncitizen suits. It
merely forbids an interpretation of the state-noncitizen clause that
would permit such suits. Thus, any federal suit against a state must be
brought under some jurisdictional heading other than the state-noncitizen clause. 13 7 Such a suit will also be subject to any common law soversupport for the proposed reading of the eleventh amendment. See Fletcher, supra note 1, at
1045-63.
As for Professor Redish's view of the language of the amendment, it is ironic that
Professor Field, who is critical of the Court for ignoring the language of the eleventh
amendment, is in turn criticized for failing to follow her own advice in interpreting the
eleventh amendment. Professor Redish is correct in his assertion that Professor Field's
justification for her reading of the eleventh amendment strains the language of the amendment. But the conclusion advocated by Professor Field can be reached with less strain by
reading the eleventh amendment in the fashion suggested in the text.
The point of Professor Field's analysis is that, because the language of the eleventh
amendment does not bar citizen suits, it should not be read to do so absent firm historical
evidence supporting such an interpretation. On this point Professor Redish agrees wholeheartedly. Redish, supra note 1, at 152. Once this point is established, the question then
becomes why the drafters circumscribed the eleventh amendment in such a fashion. Professor Field's answer to that question is certainly more faithful to the language of the
eleventh amendment than the response of the Court. See Atascadero State Hosp. v. ScanIon, 473 U.S. 234 (1985).
136. Thus, Professors Field and Fletcher maintain that the result in Hans would not
change under their analysis. Common law sovereign immunity would be available as an
affirmative defense to Louisiana, even if the eleventh amendment is not viewed as barring
Hans' claim. In fact, they both agree with Justice Brennan's assertion that this is exactly
what Hans held. See Employees, 411 U.S. at 320-21 (Brennan,J., dissenting); Field, Part One,
supra note 1, at 539 n.86; Fletcher, supra note 1, at 1039.
Today the same result could be reached by finding that there was no federal question
jurisdiction in Hans. The Court assumed there was, but under the "well-pleaded complaint" rule first enunciated in Louisville & Nashville R.R. Co. v. Mottley, 211 U.S. 149
(1908), eighteen years after Hans, that assumption could easily be overcome. Plaintiff's
claim in Hans was essentially for breach of contract. The defense to the merits would have
been that the breach was justified by state statute. Plaintiff's counterargument was that the
statute was unconstitutional because it violated the contract clause. On a virtually identical
fact pattern, Mottley held federal question jurisdiction lacking because the federal issues
were relevant only to the validity of defendant's defense and not a part of plaintiff's wellpleaded complaint. 211 U.S. at 153.
137. Fletcher, supra note 1, at 1060. Professor Field appears to take an even narrower
view of the eleventh amendment. She does not read the eleventh amendment as forbidding reliance on the state-noncitizen clause as a basis for jurisdiction. Rather, she reads it
as simply overturning Chisolm s interpretation of the state-noncitizen clause, thus forbidding a construction of the clause that abrogates sovereign immunity. Field, Part One, supra
note 1, at 543.
The difference can be seen most clearly by imagining the Chisolm suit brought today as
"Chisolm H," but this time against a state which has explicitly waived immunity from suit in
federal court. Professor Fletcher reads the eleventh amendment as "modify[ing] article III
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eign immunity defenses available to the state.
This interpretation of the eleventh amendment makes more sense
than reading into the eleventh amendment what is plainly not there - a
prohibition against suits by citizens as well as noncitizens. It also makes
more sense than interpreting the eleventh amendment as permitting
federal question claims brought by citizens against their own state while
38
barring the same claims by noncitizens.1
Under this view of the eleventh amendment, the question of amenability of states to suit in federal court requires a two step process of
analysis. The first step involves an inquiry into the subject matter jurisdiction of the court. When a state is named as a defendant, the question
is whether there is some basis for subject matter jurisdiction other than
the state-noncitizen clause of article III.
Assuming some proper basis for subject matter jurisdiction is
found, the second step requires an examination of whether the state has
available to it the defense of common law sovereign immunity. 139 This
directly by repealing one of its affirmative grants." Fletcher, supra note 1,at 1060. Thus,
he would presumably find Chisolm II barred for lack of an article III grant ofjurisdiction.
Under Professor Field's approach, however, the state-noncitizen clause is still a viable basis for jurisdiction, subject to the defense of common law sovereign immunity. Since that
defense is waived in Chisolm II, the suit would be allowed in federal court.
The interpretation of the eleventh amendment proposed in this article comes closer
on this point to Professor Fletcher's views. It is also conforms more easily to the language
of the eleventh amendment. This difference in approach seems minor, however, in comparison to the primary point of agreement that citizens and noncitizens can sue states in
federal court in cases where jurisdiction is otherwise proper, subject to the defense of
common law sovereign immunity.
138. Justice Brennan once took such a position. Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 687
(1974) (Brennan,J., dissenting). But in Employees, he referred to the question as open for
debate. Employees, 411 U.S. at 310 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
Professor Redish also has asserted that the eleventh amendment permits citizen suits
on federal question claims while barring similarly based noncitizen suits. Redish, supra
note 1,at 152. He has argued, in criticism of the views of Professor Field, that while "[i]t
might be preferable to have no constitutional bar to a suit against a state, even by out-ofstate citizens(,] .. .the only appropriate means to achieve this goal is by constitutional
amendment, not by a simple rejection of constitutional language." Id.
On a practical level, however, the position taken by Professor Redish will not lead to
results very different from those advocated by Professor Field. First, most modern suits
against states are citizen suits. For example, all of the major cases, and most of the minor
ones, listed in note 14, supra, were citizen suits. Professor Redish readily agrees that the
eleventh amendment does not bar these suits, though he may disagree with Professor
Field on the availability of a common law sovereign immunity defense. Compare Redish,
supra note 1, at 162 with Field, Part Two, supra note 1, at 1227. Second, even Professor
Redish concedes that noncitizen suits, in his view barred by the eleventh amendment, can
be authorized by Congress pursuant to its fourteenth amendment enforcement power.
Redish, supra note 1,at 152. Thus, the only suits Professor Redish finds barred by the
eleventh amendment are noncitizen suits authorized by Congress under some provision
other than the fourteenth amendment.
139. Field, Part Two, supra note 1,at 1261-62. Professor Fletcher asserts that his principal disagreement with Professor Field concerns whether sovereign immunity remains as
nothing more than a common law defense. He argues that there may be other constitutional sources of sovereign immunity, such as the tenth amendment. Fletcher, supra note
1,at Il 11-12 & n.303. This dissagreement seems largely semantic. Professor Field does
not view the tenth amendment as a source of sovereign immunity, but she does point to it
as a limitation on Congress's power to abrogate the common law sovereign immunity of
unconsenting states. Field, Part Two, supra note 1, at 1218-21. In any event, the Court's
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inquiry in turn prompts two others: first, whether the state consented to
being sued; and second, whether Congress authorized the suit by 4a0 valid
congressional enactment, thus abrogating the state's immunity.'
C.

Conceptual Difficulties: Impact of the Court's Failure to Adopt a More
Literal View of the Eleventh Amendment

The Supreme Court's decisions from Parden through Fitzpatrick have
been largely consistent with this proposed interpretation of the eleventh
amendment. In each case there was subject matter jurisdiction in the
federal courts based on the arising under clause,' 4 1 save for whatever
jurisdictional implications the Court found in a state's claim of eleventh
amendment immunity. In each case the availability of an immunity defense to the federal claim rested in some fashion on the questions of
state consent or congressional authorization. The Court has been asking all the right questions. Only the reasons for asking them have been
wrong.
Thus, the question of whether to adopt the proposed interpretation
of the eleventh amendment could be viewed as a simple matter of semantics, since its adoption need not disturb the outcome of the Court's
decisions. 14 2 But it is important that the Court ask the right questions
for the right reasons because the Court's purpose in asking a question
cannot help but influence its answer.
At a minimum, a decision by the Court to adopt the proposed interpretation of the eleventh amendment would eliminate the three earlier
described conceptual dilemmas caused by the Court's current position:
first, how the eleventh amendment can be read to bar citizen suits when
it says nothing about them; second, how states can confer subject matter
jurisdiction on the federal courts by consent; and finally, how Congress
can statutorily authorize suits barred by the eleventh amendment.
More significantly, however, in terms of its effect on the outcome of
eleventh amendment cases, the elimination of these conceptual dilemmas would reduce analytical confusion about how these cases should be
43
decided.1
subsequent overruling of National League of Cities in Garcia v. San Antonio Metropolitan
Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528 (1985), makes the tenth amendment unavailable as a source
of, or limitation on, congressional power to abrogate sovereign immunity.
140. Field, Part One, supra note 1, at 543-45; Fletcher, supra note 1, at 1130.
141. In each case, plaintiff's cause of action was created by federal legislation-the
FELA in Parden, the FLSA in Employees, § 1983 in Edelman, and Title VII in Fitzpatrickthereby bringing each case within the arising under jurisdiction of the federal courts.
142. Professor Field suggests that the results in the Court's modern eleventh amendment cases would not have to change in order to accommodate her theories. Field, Part
One, supra note 1, at 545; Field, Part Two, supra note 1, at 1279-80; see also Fletcher, supra
note 1, at 1131.
143. A comparison of Employees and Fitzpatrick reveals some of the confusion flowing
from the Court's unwillingness to confront the conceptual dilemmas inherent in its vision
of the eleventh amendment. In Employees, the Court required what seemed to be an inordinate degree of congressional explicitness to sustain a finding of legislative abrogation of
the eleventh amendment. By contrast, the Court was noticeably less concerned about congressional explicitness in Fitzpatrick. Both opinions were devoid of analysis of the differ-
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D. Analytical Difficulties: Explaining Parden through Fitzpatrick
As has been suggested earlier, the Court's analytical difficulties with
the eleventh amendment occur in two related ways: first, in failing to
explain the relationship between consent and congressional authorization; and second, in failing to delineate the kinds of consent and authorization required to overcome the eleventh amendment.
1. The Subtleties of Consent and Congressional Authorization
To take the latter point first, the cases seem to contradict themselves on the question of consent. Parden accepts constructive consent
as a basis for overcoming the eleventh amendment while Edelman appears to reject it. However, the Court's holding in Edelman was more
limited. Edelman held that consent must normally be stated expressly. 14 4
But the Edelman Court did not overrule Parden, which was based at least
partially on constructive consent. How then was Parden abnormal? The
answer rests on the relationship between consent and congressional authorization, as will be discussed in the next section.
The cases also seem contradictory on the question of congressional
authorization. The Court in Employees said Congress was not explicit
enough about authorizing suits against states in federal court, even
though authorization was more explicit in Employees than in Parden.
Then the Edelman Court found authorization in both Parden and Employees, but again without explaining why it was nevertheless insufficient in
Employees. Finally, the Fitzpatrick Court said there was authorization in
Parden but not in Employees.
However, the cases can be viewed as consistent on the issue of conence. One explanation, however, might relate to the Court's unspoken conceptual
difficulty with the notion that Congress could legislatively abrogate what the Court conceived of as a constitutional immunity.
In Fitzpatrick Congress acted pursuant to the
fourteenth amendment. Justice Rehnquist noted that the fourteenth amendment was
aimed at limiting state power. It also gave Congress specific authority to pass legislation
enforcing its provisions. Because this specific fourteenth amendment power postdated the
eleventh amendment, he concluded that Congress could use this power to subject the
states to law suits otherwise barred by the eleventh amendment. 427 U.S. at 456.
By contrast, in Employees Congress acted pursuant to its commerce power. That the
Court had some concern with Congress's power to abrogate the eleventh amendment
through the use of its commerce power is evidenced by the fact that the Court held such an
effort unconstitutional three years later in National League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833
(1976). However, the Employees Court did not hold, or even suggest, that Congress could
not abrogate the eleventh amendment with its commerce power. If anything, the Court
implied the contrary by refused to assume Congress intended such a result absent extraordinarily explicit language. 411 U.S. at 287. When Congress provided the requisite language by amending the FLSA the Court was again able to avoid coming to grips with the
conceptual difficulties underlying its interpretation of the eleventh amendment by declaring Congress's actions unconstitutional on tenth amendment grounds. NVational League of
Cities, 426 U.S. at 852.
Because the Court chose to resolve Employees and Fitzpatrick without confronting the
difficulties with its concept of the eleventh amendment, the result was confusion about the
analytical basis for distinguishing the two cases.
144. The Court stated that "[clonstructive consent is not a doctrine commonily associated with the surrender of constitutional rights, and we see no place for it here." Edelman
v. Jordan, 411 U.S. 651, 673 (1974) (emphasis added).
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gressional authorization as well. When Edelman says there was authorization in Employees and Fitzpatrick says there was not, the Court is
referring to two different kinds of authorization. Edelman was referring
to implicit authorization, which the Court described as authorization to
sue "a general class of defendants which literally includes States." 145 By
contrast, Fitzpatrick was referring to explicit authorization, which the
Court in Employees thought was lacking, as evidenced by its unwillingness
"to infer that Congress .

.

. desired silently to deprive the States of an

immunity they have long enjoyed under another part of the Constitution." 146 Viewed in this light, there was implicit authorization in Employees, as the Court noted in Edelman. 14 7 Nevertheless, there was no explicit
14 8
authorization in Employees, as the Court later noted in Fitzpatrick.
The cases still seem contradictory insofar as Parden permits suits
based on implicit authorization, while Employees requires explicit authorization. But even this contradiction can be explained by examining the
relationship between consent and congressional authorization.
2.

The Link Between Consent and Congressional Authorization

Consent and congressional authorization, in the cases from Parden
through Fitzpatrick, exist on two levels: independent and dependent.
Express consent by a state will defeat state immunity independent of the
question of congressional authorization. 14 9 By the same token, explicit
congressional authorization will defeat state immunity, regardless of the
question of state consent.1 50 So long as either one is sufficiently clear,
state immunity will be overcome. In this sense, the questions of consent
and congressional authorization are independent of each other.
When neither consent nor congressional authorization is expressed
with sufficient clarity to decide the issue independently, the availability
of state immunity mus.t be determined by considering the questions of
consent and congressional authorization together. In this sense, they
become dependent variables.
This dependency occurs when a state constructively consents to being
sued in federal court, as Alabama did in Parden by entering into the interstate railroad business. Whenever constructive consent is alleged,
145. 415 U.S. at 672.
146. Employees, 411 U.S. 279, 285 (1973).
147. Justice Rehnquist stated that Congress had authorized suits "against a general
class of defendants," in this case employers, which literally included states. 415 U.S. at
674.
148. 427 U.S. at 452. Congress, in the statutory scheme involved in Employees, had not
explicitly stated that private enforcement suits could be brought against states in federal

court. These suits were nevertheless implicitly authorized when Congress provided for
private enforcement suits against "employers" in federal court and amended the definition
of employers to include certain state entities.
149. Edelman, 415 U.S. at 673; Murray v. Wilson Distilling Co., 213 U.S. 151, 171

(1909). Of course, in order to sue a state some law must create a cause of action on
plaintiff's behalf. However, that law need not be created by Congress.
150. Fitzpatrick, 427 U.S. at 456; Employees, 411 U.S. at 283. For this reason, it is sometimes referred to as "congressional abrogation."

See Atascadero State Hosp. v. Scanlon,

473 U.S. 234, 253 (1985) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
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the surrounding circumstances must be examined to determine both
whether there is consent, and to what consent was given. In other
words, unlike express consent, which by definition identifies the terms of
the consent within itself, constructive consent must be viewed in the
context of external circumstances. Relevant circumstances in Parden included what Congress said would happen to those choosing to enter the
interstate railroad business. When a state engages in activities having
the effect of bringing it within a general class of defendants which Congress has chosen to regulate, and against whom Congress has authorized suits in federal court, then the state can be said to have
15 1
constructively consented to a suit implicitly authorized by Congress.
3.

The Theory Applied to the Cases

The Parden Court found that Alabama's entrance into the railroad
business, coupled with Congress's prior authorization of suits against
railroad employers, justified a finding of constructive consent. 1 52 Because constructive consent was present, the Court was not concerned
about whether Congress had explicitly stated its intent to abrogate state
immunity.' 5 3 By the same token, express consent was not necessary in
light of Alabama's actions taken in the face of Congress's enactment of
the FELA. But neither Congress's enactment of the FELA nor Alabama's entry into the railroad business, by itself, would have been suffi54
cient to overcome Alabama's sovereign immunity defense. 1
Viewing Parden this way, both Employees and Edelman become easily
distinguishable from Parden, although each for different reasons. In
Employees, there was no basis for constructive consent, because Missouri
merely continued to perform its traditional governmental functions in
the face of new congressional regulation of that activity. Furthermore,
the Court refused to assume that Congress intended to abrogate state
immunity unilaterally, absent explicit statutory language to that
55

effect. 1

151. Parden v. Terminal Ry. Co., 377 U.S. 184, 192-93 (1964).
152. The Parden Court did not make it clear that congressional authorization and consent were linked together in the manner suggested. Parden was an ambiguous hodgepodge, as even its author later conceded. Employees, 411 U.S. 279, 301 (1973) (Brennan,J.,
dissenting).
In light of later decisions, however, it is apparent that what justified the result in
Parden was the coupling of Alabama's actions in acquiring a railroad with prior congressional authorization of suits against railroad employers. See, e.g., Edelman v. Jordan, 415
U.S. 651, 672 (1974); Employees, 411 U.S. 279, 282 (1973) (majority opinion); id. at 288
(Marshall, J., concurring).
153. This distinction became clearer in Justice Douglas' majority opinion in Employees,
and became the focus of Justice Douglas' dissent in Edelman.
154. Had Congress not enacted the FELA, there would have been no basis for constructive consent. To what, after all, would Alabama have been consenting? By the same
token, congressional authorization of suits against railroads would have had no impact on
the eleventh amendment, absent Alabama's entry into the railroad business.
155. Unfortunately, Justice Douglas' opinion in Employees obscured the relationship between consent and congressional authorization. He could simply have held that in the
absence of express or constructive consent the Court would require Congress to manifest
clearly its intent to impose FLSA suits on unwilling states. Instead, he appeared to distin-
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In Edelman, by comparison, constructive consent could have been
based on Illinois' acceptance of matching federal money. However,
Congress had not authorized suits against states under the Social Security Act. The only enforcement mechanism Congress provided in the Social Security Act against noncomplying states was termination of
funding.' 5 6 This justified the Court's conclusion that Illinois had not
been put on notice that, in exchange for receiving federal money, it
15 7
would be deemed to have consented to suit in federal court.
Finally, in Fitzpatrick, although there was no basis for finding any
form of consent by Connecticut, the Court held that Title VII had been
sufficiently explicit about authorizing suits against states to demonstrate
congressional authorization independent of state consent. ' 58
There is a pattern to these four cases that perhaps can be seen more
159
clearly in the following chart:
STATE CONSENT
express
constructive

CONGRESSIONAL
AUTHORIZATION
explicit
Fitzpatrick
implicit
Parden
Employees
none
Edelman

Parden
Edelman
none
Employees
Fitzpatrick
Parden represents what might be viewed as the minimum standard
for waiver of state immunity: constructive consent by a state to a suit
implicitly authorized by Congress. Since there was no consent of any
guish Parden from Employees on the basis of lack of congressional authorization. This holding made no sense because Congress had been more explicit in Employees than it had in
Parden. Justice Douglas eventually provided some clarification of his position in his
Edelman dissent. See Edelman v.Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 678 (1974) (Douglas,J., dissenting).
156. 415 U.S. at 674.
157. The question was a close one. As Justices Douglas and Marshall pointed out in
their dissenting opinions, prior cases had held that the provisions of the Social Security
Act could be enforced against participating states by § 1983 actions in the federal courts.
However, it had not been settled whether retroactive monetary awards damages payable
out of state treasuries were available.
158. 427 U.S. at 456.
159. What is depicted on this chart as three distinct levels of consent and authorization
could more realistically be viewed as a sliding scale or spectrum with explicit consent or
authorization at one end and no consent or authorization at the other end. Other factors
should also be balanced on the scale. These include the burden such suits impose on
states and the source of congressional power to regulate state activity.
For example, in comparing Parden and Employees, it is obvious that the burden imposed
on states by the FLSA was considerably greater than that imposed by the FELA. This
difference was a significant factor in distinguishing Parden from Employees. 411 U.S. at 285.
Equally revealing is a comparison between Fitzpatrick and Employees. The burdens imposed
on states by Title VII were certainly no less than those imposed by the FLSA. However,
Title VII was enacted pursuant to Congress's specific fourteenth amendment enforcement
powers, which explicitly authorizes congressional regulation of state activities, rather than
the more general provisions of the commerce clause. This fact, coupled with slightly more
explicit congressional authorization in Title VII, caused the Court to distinguish Fitzpatrick
from Employees. Fitzpatrick, 427 U.S. at 456.
Nevertheless, the consent/authorization chart serves a useful purpose in clarifying the
relationship between state consent and congressional authorization in the Supreme
Court's eleventh amendment precedent.
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kind in Employees, only explicit congressional authorization could overcome state immunity. The Court was not satisfied that the existing evidence of Congress's intent to regulate state activities through the FLSA
was enough to meet this heavy burden. In Edelman, Congress could have
conditioned state acceptance of federal money on consent to suit but did
not. Absent an indication by Congress that states accepting federal
money would be subject to suit in federal court, there could be no constructive consent based on the mere receipt of federal money, and barring the suit was appropriate. Finally, in Fitzpatrick, congressional
authorization was sufficiently explicit to overcome state immunity, independent of the issue of state consent.
When viewed in this fashion, the cases from Parden through Fitzpatrick are consistent. Perhaps even more significantly, they make sense.
For example, Justice Douglas' suggestion in Employees that Congress
had not made sufficiently clear its intention to subject states to private
enforcement suits in federal court has caused endless confusion. 160 Indeed, it is difficult to imagine how Congress could have rewritten the
1966 FLSA amendments to make clearer its desire to authorize state
16 1
suits in federal court.
Under the proposed analysis of these cases, the reason for the decision in Employees becomes clear. However carefully Congress amended
the FLSA to include state and local governments in the definition of
"employers" covered by the FLSA, and therefore subject to suit in federal court, the statute does not on its face declare that states can be sued
in federal court. As such, in the absence of some basis for imposing
constructive consent, the level of congressional authorization found in
Employees was insufficient to overcome state immunity.
It makes sense to require that Congress state its intentions explicitly
on the face of the statute when considering that this requirement applies
only where the obligations imposed on states by Congress are not just
substantial, but wholely involuntary. Requiring that Congress declare in
express statutory language that states can be sued in federal court,
serves two salutary purposes. It forces Congress to consider more directly the issues and problems of subjecting states to suit in federal
court without their consent and lessens the chances that some members
of Congress will vote in favor of the legislation without understanding
62
its full implications. 1

160. See, e.g., Field, Part Two, supra note 1, at 1244-46 (noting apparent conflict between
Parden and Employees "in their approaches to divining congressional intent," describing the
Employees opinion as "oblique," and concluding that Employees created "uncertainty" and

"considerable ambiguity").

161. Justices Brennan and Marshall, despite their disagreement on the proper result,
lambasted the majority for concluding that the FLSA failed to demonstrate congressional
authorization. Employees, 411 U.S. at 289-90 (Marshall,J., concurring); id. at 301-08 (Bren-

nan, J., dissenting).
162.

When one section of a complex statutory scheme authorizes private enforcement

suits against "employers," and another provision defines employers to include specified
state entities, legislators unfamiliar with the legislation may not realize the significance of
voting to authorize such suits. When in addition, the legislation extends the right to sue to
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These concerns are not as pressing when states choose to participate in federally regulated activities. It follows that in such cases the
Court will be less concerned about congressional authorization. The
Court's primary concern should then be whether states were fairly put
on notice of the consequences of their participation in these activities.
This concern is satisfied when Congress makes it clear on the face of the
regulatory legislation that enforcement suits in federal court are authorized against a general class of defendants which states may join by participating in the regulated activities.
It was against this backdrop that the Supreme Court decided Atascadero State Hospital v. Scanlon,' 63 and either departed from or seriously
distorted the analytical framework established by its precedent. As a result of Atascadero, the burden on a plaintiff seeking to enforce federally
created rights against states in the federal courts has been significantly
increased. If the Court misconstrued prior case law, it did so at least
partially as a result of its failure to articulate adequately in those earlier
cases an intelligible framework for resolving eleventh amendment
problems.
III.

ATASCADERO STATE HOSPITAL 1. SCANLON

Atascadero was a suit under section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of
1973.164 The plaintiff sought injunctive and retroactive monetary relief
against a California state hospital which allegedly denied him employment due to his physical handicaps.' 6 5 Section 504 of the Rehabilitation
Act provides that "otherwise qualified handicapped individual[s]" shall
not "be subjected to discrimination under any program ...receiving
Federal financial assistance." 16 6 Section 505 of the same act states that
the remedies provided in Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, which
include compensatory and injunctive relief in the federal courts, will be
available to anyone aggrieved by "any recipient of Federal assistance"
under section 504.167 The state hospital, a recipient of federal financial
assistance under the provisions of section 504, defended in part on elev68
enth amendment grounds. 1

The district court dismissed plaintiff's claims based on the eleventh
amendment.' 69 The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed on different grounds. It took the position that the plaintiff's complaint was deficient because it failed to allege that the federal funds received by
defendant had a primary objective of providing employment opportunia large class of state employees engaged in traditionally state governmental activities, and
the remedies include double damages and attorneys' fees, it seems reasonable to insist that
the authorizing language be sufficiently explicit to apprise individual legislators of the full
significance of the proposed legislation. Employees, 411 U.S. at 285-86.
163. 473 U.S. 234 (1985).
164. Rehabilitation Act of 1973, § 504, 29 U.S.C. § 794 (1982).
165. 473 U.S. at 236.
166. Rehabilitation Act of 1973, § 504, 29 U.S.C. § 794 (1982).
167. Rehabilitation Act of 1978, § 505, 29 U.S.C. § 794a (1982).
168. 473 U.S. at 236.
169. Id.
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ties.1 70 The Supreme Court vacated the judgment and remanded the
case to the court of appeals for reconsideration in light of its recent decision in ConsolidatedRail Corporationv. Darrone,1 7 1 which had held that section 504's prohibition of handicap discrimination in employment was
not limited to programs that received federal funds for purposes of employment.1 72 The court of appeals found Darrone controlling and thus
had to face the eleventh amendment basis for the district court's dismissal. This time the court of appeals reversed the judgment of the district
court, concluding that the eleventh amendment was not a bar to the suit
because California had constructively consented to the suit by accepting
federal financial assistance. The court of appeals noted that, unlike
Edelman, "the threshold fact of congressional authorization to sue a class
of defendants which literally includes States," was present in
A tascadero. 73
The Supreme Court granted certiorari again,17 4 this time to resolve
a conflict between the Ninth Circuit and the First and Eight Circuits on
the eleventh amendment question.' 75 The Supreme Court reversed,
holding by a five to four vote that the plaintiff's monetary claims were
barred by the eleventh amendment. Justice Powell wrote the opinion
for the Court with Justices Brennan, Marshall, Blackmun, and Stevens
dissenting.
A. Justice Powell's Majority Opinion
In holding that the plaintiff's monetary claims against California
were barred by the eleventh amendment, Justice Powell addressed three
principal arguments: first, that California had waived its immunity by
express provision in its own constitution; second, that Congress had abrogated California's sovereign immunity by enacting the Rehabilitation
Act; and third, that California constructively consented to being sued in
federal court by accepting federal financial assistance under the terms of
76
the Rehabilitation Act. 1
Justice Powell found no merit in the express waiver argument. In
Edelman, the Court had held that in order to waive its eleventh amendment immunity expressly, a state must specify that it is consenting to suit
against it infederal court; a general waiver of immunity, however express it
might be, would not suffice. 1 77 Justice Powell adopted that reasoning,
concluding that the provision in the California constitution permitting
suits "against the State in such manner and in such courts as shall be
170. Scanlon v. Atascadero State Hosp., 677 F.2d 1271, 1272 (9th Cir. 1982), vacated,
465 U.S. 1095 (1984).
171. 465 U.S. 624 (1984).
172. Atascadero State Hosp. v. Scanlon, 465 U.S. 1095 (1984).
173. Scanlon v. Atascadero State Hosp., 735 F.2d 359, 361 (9th Cir. 1984), rev'd, 473
U.S. 234 (1985).
174. 469 U.S. 1032 (1984).
175. 473 U.S. at 237.
176. Id. at 240.
177. 415 U.S. 651, 673 (1974).
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constitute an express waiver of
directed by law"' 178 was insufficient to
79
immunity from suit in federal court.1
Justice Powell next addressed plaintiff's second argument, that
Congress had abrogated state immunity by enacting the Rehabilitation
Act. He refused to consider legislative history which plaintiff offered in
support of the conclusion that Congress intended to abrogate state immunity. He justified this refusal by noting the well established requirement that Congress' intent to abrogate immunity must be "unmistakably
clear in the language of the statute" before the Court will assume that
Congress truly desired such a result.' 8 0 Justice Powell determined that
the language of section 505, authorizing relief against "any recipient of
Federal assistance," failed to demonstrate the "unequivocal statutory
language" needed to abrogate the eleventh amendment. 18
The final argument addressed by Justice Powell was that made by
the court of appeals, that California had constructively consented to suit
by voluntarily accepting federal funding under the Rehabilitation Act.
Justice Powell agreed with the observation of the court of appeals that
mere receipt of federal funds will not support a finding of constructive
consent.' 8 2 The court of appeals, however, had concluded that Atascadero involved more than the mere receipt of federal funds because California had accepted federal funding under a legislative scheme that, by
its terms, authorized suit against "any recipient of Federal assistance"
provided by that legislation.' 8 3 Justice Powell held that this additional
factor was not enough to support a finding of state consent. Referring
to plaintiff's congressional authorization argument, he reiterated that
Congress had failed to make unmistakably clear in the Rehabilitation Act
its intent to subject unconsenting states to suit in federal court. He concluded on the same basis that the Act failed to demonstrate "a clear
intent by Congress" to make state consent to suit in federal court a condition of receiving federal money. 184 As a result, he found that the case
was barred by the eleventh amendment.
178.

CAL. CONST. art. III, § 5.

179. 473 U.S. at 241.
180.

Id. at 242. Justice Powell did not cite the Employees case. Instead, he cited two

more recent decisions that trace their support directly back to Employees. Id. (citing Pennhurst State School & Hosp. v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89, 98 (1984) and Quern v. Jordan,
440 U.S. 332, 343-44 (1979)). Pennhurst cited Quern, which in turn cited Employees for the
proposition that Congress must state its intent to abrogate state immunity explicitly.
Justice Powell may have been trying to insulate himself from the implication in Employees that Congress can use its commerce clause power to abrogate state immunity. The
Court, in cases subsequent to Employees, has made a concerted effort to tie Congress's
power of abrogation to the fourteenth amendment. See, e.g., Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 427 U.S.
445, 456 (1976). That objective was furthered in Atascadero by the reference to Pennhurst
and Quern, and the Court's refusal to acknowledge the historical roots of this power in
Employees and the commerce clause.
181. 473 U.S. at 245-46.
182. Id. at 246-47.
183. 735 F.2d at 362.
184. 473 U.S. at 247.
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The Dissenting Opinions

Justices Brennan, Marshall, Blackmun and Stevens joined together
in a dissenting opinion written by Justice Brennan. Justice Blackmun
also wrote a separate dissent. 18 5 Justice Brennan's opinion began by
examining the legislative history of the Rehabilitation Act. Pointing to
numerous references in the legislative debates suggesting that states
were among the primary targets of section 504, Justice Brennan concluded that Congress without question had intended to abrogate state
immunity and subject the states to suits in federal court under the Reha86
bilitation Act. 1
The major portion of justice Brennan's fifty-five page opinion consisted of historical analysis of sovereign immunity and the eleventh
amendment, and a critique of Hans v. Louisiana and its progeny.1 8 7 As a
way of correcting the deficiencies in the Court's eleventh amendment
doctrine, Justice Brennan advocated adoption of a more literal interpretation of the eleventh amendment, similar to the one proposed by
Professors Field and Fletcher.18 8
Justice Blackmun's opinion was much shorter. He began by agreeing with all of Justice Brennan's historical arguments and urged the
Court to reconsider Hans and its progeny, just as it had recently reconsidered its position on the tenth amendment' 8 9 by overruling National
League of Cities v. Usery 190 in Garcia v. San Antonio Metropolitan Transit Authority. 19 He expressed continuing support for the views expressed in
185. Justice Stevens added a one paragraph explanation of why he was taking a position inconsistent with the one he took in Florida Dep't of Health & Rehabilitative Serv. v.
Florida Nursing Home Ass'n, 450 U.S. 147, 151 (1981). In Florida iVursing Homes, Justice
Stevens concurred in a judgment he believed to be incorrect because he felt bound by the
Court's prior decision in Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651 (1974). By the time Atascadero
was decided, Justice Stevens had become persuaded that Edelman was "egregiously incorrect." He therefore decided to cast stare decisis aside and join Justices Brennan, Marshall
and Blackmun in dissent. 473 U.S. at 304 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
186. 473 U.S. at 248-52 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
187. Id. at 258-302 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
188. Although Justice Brennan did not state that he was advocating adoption of the
views of Professors Field or Fletcher, his opinion cited their works in several places. See,
e.g., Atascadero, 473 U.S. at 258 n. ll, 263 n.13, 270 n.20, 277 n.26, 279 n.29, 298 n.52
(Brennan, J., dissenting). When comparing Justice Brennan's Atascadero dissent to his earlier opinions, it becomes clear that his current position is based on their views. For example, Justice Brennan, as early as his Employees dissent, urged a literal interpretation of the
eleventh amendment that would not bar citizen suits in federal court. Employees, 411 U.S.
279, 309-10 (1973). At that time, however, his view assumed that noncitizen suits would
be barred by the eleventh amendment. Id. at 310 (Brennan, J., dissenting); Edelman, 415
U.S. at 687 (BrennanJ., dissenting). Not until his dissent in Atascadero did Justice Brennan
adopt the position that the eleventh amendment does not bar any suit in federal court in
which subject matter jurisdiction is based on some provision other than the state-noncitizen clause of article III, section two. 473 U.S. at 301 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
One interesting sidelight is that Professor Fletcher served as Justice Brennan's law
clerk in 1976-77. Professor Fletcher wrote his article in 1983, and Atascadero was the next
significant eleventh amendment case decided by the Court.
189. 473 U.S. at 302-03 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
190. 426 U.S. 833 (1976).
191. 469 U.S. 528 (1985).
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Justice Marshall's dissenting opinion in Edelman.' 92 He concluded that
the judgment of the court of appeals should have been affirmed because
California, by voluntarily accepting federal funding under the Rehabilitation Act, had constructively consented to suit in federal court. He also
concluded that Congress had abrogated California's immunity from suit
by enacting the Rehabilitation Act in the exercise of its fourteenth
3

amendment power. 19

C.

How Atascadero Should Have Been Decided

Obviously the Supreme Court could not decide Atascadero on the
grounds it did and remain consistent with its analysis in Parden through
Fitzpatrick. The problem with Atascadero lies in the Court's failure to
grasp the distinction between the congressional authorization argument
made by the plaintiff and the constructive consent argument of the court
of appeals.
The Court was correct in rejecting plaintiff's congressional authorization argument because Congress had not made itself "unmistakably
clear in the language of the statute" on that point. It was also correct in
perceiving that a finding of constructive consent by California would depend on a finding that Congress intended to exact from states their consent to suit in federal court in exchange for Rehabilitation Act funding.
However, the Court erred in viewing these two inquiries into congressional intent as identical.
The principle reason for the "unmistakably clear" requirement in
the cases prior to Atascadero was that, without any kind of state consent,
the Court was unwilling to assume Congress intended unilaterally to
subject states to suits in federal court unless the language of the statute
documented in unmistakable terms Congress's intent to do so.' 94 Such
precautions are not necessary when there is a basis for finding that a
state has constructively consented to suit. When a state engages in activities that subject it to federal regulation, the concern shifts to whether
Congress has made it sufficiently clear to the state being regulated pre19 5
cisely which activities will be subject to what sort of control.
192. 415 U.S. at 688.
193. 473 U.S. at 304 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
194. Noting that subjecting states to federal suits might place enormous fiscal burdens
on the states, Justice Douglas wrote that "Congress, acting responsibly, would not be presumed to take such action silently." Employees, 411 U.S. 279, 284-85 (1973). In his Edelman
dissent, however, he later argued that "[wihere a State has consented to join a federalstate cooperative project, it is realistic to conclude that the State has agreed to assume its
obligations under that legislation." 415 U.S. at 685 (Douglas. J., dissenting).
195. This was the primary basis for disagreement between the majority and dissenters
in Edelman. Justice Rehnquist, for the majority, noted that the Social Security Act provisions did not authorize enforcement suits and therefore provided no basis for finding "a
waiver by a participating State of its Eleventh Amendment immunity." 415 U.S. at 674.
Justices Douglas and Marshall in dissent would have found that § 1983, and the case law
applying it in the context of enforcement of the Social Security Act, had made sufficiently
clear to states that their participation in federal-state Social Security Act programs would
subject them to § 1983 suits to enforce the Act. 415 U.S. at 679-80 (Douglas. J., dissenting); id. at 690 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
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Viewed in this light, the error in the majority's analysis in Atascadero
becomes obvious. Given California's voluntary decision to accept federal funding under the terms of the Rehabilitation Act, Atascadero should
have been analyzed as a constructive consent/implicit authorization
case. Thus, the relevant inquiry should not have been whether Congress made its intent to subject states to suit unmistakably clear on the
face of the Rehabilitation Act. Rather, the Court should have asked
whether California was fairly put on notice that recipients of federal
funding under the Rehabilitation Act could be subjected to enforcement
suits in federal court for violating the terms of the Act.
Ironically, a careful analysis of this question might have justified the
same result eventually reached by the Court. Prior to the Supreme
Court's decision in Consolidated Rail Corporation v. Darrone,1 96 which was
not handed down until after the first decision of the court of appeals in
Atascadero,19 7 it was unclear whether the nondiscrimination provisions of
the Rehabilitation Act applied to all recipients of Rehabilitation Act
funds, or only those receiving funds for the primary objective of providing employment. 1 98 Thus, an argument could have been made that California was not fairly put on notice of the consequences that would flow
from its acceptance of Rehabilitation Act funding. Nevertheless, the answer to this question was far less clear than the answer to the question
the Court did address.
CONCLUSION

Prior to Atascadero, the eleventh amendment could be overcome in
three ways: express consent of the state, explicit congressional authorization, or constructive consent to a suit implicitly authorized by Congress. Atascadero apparently has narrowed the possibilities down to two:
express consent or explicit authorization.
For future plaintiffs suing state employers under the Rehabilitation
Act, Atascadero will not matter. On October 21, 1986, Congress
amended the Act to abrogate explicitly the eleventh amendment immunity of states violating section 504.199 Nevertheless, Atascadero remains
196. 465 U.S. 624 (1984).
197. The first decision by the court of appeals in Atascadero was handed down in 1982.
Darrone was not decided until 1984.
198. The result in Darrone was prefigured in North Haven Bd. of Educ. v. Bell, 456 U.S.
512 (1982). North Haven held that the prohibition of employment discrimination in Title
IX did not incorporate a "primary objective" requirement even though it, like the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, borrowed language from Title VI, which did contain a "primary objective" limitation. Id. at 527-30; Darrone, 465 U.S. at 632 n.13. The North Haven decision,
however, was handed down only one week before the first court of appeals decision in
A tascadero.
199. Congress provided that:
(1) A State shall not be immune under the Eleventh Amendment of the Constitution of the United States from suit in Federal court for a violation of section 504
of the Rehabilitation of 1973, title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972, the
Age Discrimination Act of 1975, title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, or the
provisions of any other Federal statute prohibiting discrimination by recipients of
Federal financial assistance.
(2) In a suit against a State for violation of a statute referred to in paragraph (1),
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the most recent statement by the Court of the standards for determining
when a plaintiff can enforce federally protected rights against a state in
the federal courts.
In that regard, Atascadero could be viewed as simply another example of the Supreme Court expounding on the eleventh amendment in a
manner bewildering to all concerned. On the other hand, it could be
interpreted as a conscious effort to stake out higher ground, setting up
new and more difficult hurdles for plaintiffs to clear in order to enforce
claims against states in federal court. Whatever else might be said about
Atascadero, the Court, by its refusal or failure to acknowledge its departure from precedent, has added one more layer to the wealth of confusion that has permeated the eleventh amendment for more than a
century.
Perhaps the most curious thing about Atascadero is the nearly total
neglect of Parden by both the majority and dissenting opinions. 2 00 The
majority's disinclination to discuss Parden is almost understandable. The
Court may have felt that it had run out of ways of distinguishing Parden
from its progeny. Employees could be distinguished from Parden on the
basis of consent which was found lacking in Employees. Edelman could be
distinguished for lack of congressional authorization. However, congressional authorization was much more apparent in Atascadero than it
had been in Edelman or Parden. Furthermore, it was possible to conclude
that by accepting federal funds under the Rehabilitation Act, California
had consented as a condition of that funding to federal enforcement by
suits against it, just as Alabama had consented to suits under the FELA
in Parden by entering the interstate railroad business. Thus, for the maremedies (including remedies both at law and in equity) are available for such a
violation to the same extent as such remedies are available for such a violation in
the suit against any public or private entity other than the State.
Rehabilitation Act Amendments of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-506, § 1003, 100 Stat. 1845
(1986). Presumably this provision will satisfy the standard of explicitness required in Atascadero to abrogate the eleventh amendment.
Interestingly, the Senate Report accompanying the legislation states that section 1003
"clarifies the intent of Congress" and that "[t]he Supreme Court's decision [in Atascadero]
misinterpreted congressional intent." S. Rep. No. 388, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 27 (1986).
Perhaps as a result of this legislative history, a case was brought before the Court asserting
that, in light of this amendment, Atascadero should be overturned. Dunlap v. University of
Ky., 815 F.2d 702 (6th Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 56 U.S.L.W. 3354 (U.S. November 16, 1987)
(No. 86-2029). Of course, evidence of what the 99th Congress desires does not by itself
establish what the 93rd and 95th Congress intended in enacting sections 504 and 505 of
the Rehabilitation Act. However, there was considerable support in the legislative history
of the Act of Congress's intent to permit suits against participating states. See Alascadero,
473 U.S. at 248-252 (Brennan,J., dissenting). Nevertheless, Atascadero'sapplication of the
congressional authorization standard of prior cases was correct. The 95th Congress, unlike the 99th Congress, did not make unmistakably clear on the face of the Rehabilitation
Act its intent to abrogate the eleventh amendment. The error in Atascadero lay in importing this explicitness requirement from the context of congressional authorization to the
context of constructive consent.
200. The only reference to Parden appears as a string citation in a footnote in the majority opinion. Atascadero, 473 U.S. at 243 n.3. The footnote documents the assertion that
the Court has consistently held that "the fundamental principle of sovereign immunity
limits the grant ofjudicial authority in Art. III." (quoting Pennhurst State School & Hosp.
v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89, 98 (1984) and citing fifteen other cases, including Parden).
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jority, it may have seemed that Parden either had to be overruled or
ignored.
But why did the dissenters neglect Parden? Either they misunderstood Parden, or they disagreed with what they thought it had come to
mean. There is support for the latter possibility. It was Justice Brennan
who wrote Parden, and who, ever since Employees, has been trying to convince the rest of the Court that Parden did not mean what everyone else
thought it did. 20 1 The ultimate irony of Atascadero may be that when
four members of the Court finally agreed upon a workable conception of
the eleventh amendment that could support the analytical framework
created by Parden, they chose to ignore that framework, while the rest of
the Court took its most significant step away from Parden, once again
defying the language and intent of the drafters of the eleventh
amendment.
ADDENDUM

On June 25, 1987, the Supreme Court announced its latest contribution to the eleventh amendment fray. 20 2 In Welch v. State Departmentof
Highways & Public Transportation,20 3 a plurality of four, in an opinion written by Justice Powell, invoked the eleventh amendment to bar a Jones
Act suit by a ferry dock employee against his employer, the Texas Department of Highways. 20 4 A majority was attained with Justice Scalia's
concurrence in the judgment. 20 5 Justice White, though part of the plurality, also contributed a separate concurring opinion. 20 6 Justice Brennan wrote a lengthy dissent reiterating the historical arguments he made
in his Atascadero dissent. Predictably for eleventh amendment cases, he
20 7
was joined by Justices Marshall, Blackmun and Stevens.
In Welch the Court finally reached a point where it could neither
ignore Parden v. Terminal Railway, as it did in Atascadero, nor distinguish
it, as it did in Employees and Edelman. Welch presented a fact pattern identical to Parden except that the plaintiff brought his suit under the Jones
Act instead of the FELA. But even that distinction was transparent, as
the Court recognized, since the Jones Act simply "applied the remedial
provisions of the FELA to seamen." 208 Thus, the Court had either to
201.

Employees, 411 U.S. 279, 299 (1973) (Brennan, J., dissenting); Edelman, 415 U.S.

651, 687 (1974) (Brennan, J., dissenting); Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 427 U.S. 445, 457 (1976)
(Brennan, J. dissenting).

202. This addendum was written after work on the main body of this article was
completed.
203. 107 S. Ct. 2941 (1987).
204. Id. at 2944. Section 33 of the Jones Act, 46 U.S.C. § 688 (1982), provides a cause
of action to any seaman suffering personal injury in the course of employment.
205. 107 S.Ct. at 2957 (Scalia,J., concurring). Justice Scalia's concurrence in the judgment was based on his reluctance to entertain a question not addressed in the parties'
briefs about the correctness of Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1 (1890). He did, however,
agree with the plurality's decision to overrule Parden. 107 S. Ct. at 2958.
206. 107 S.Ct. at 2957 (White, J., concurring).
207. Id. at 2958 (Brennan, J.,dissenting).
208. 107 S.Ct. at 2944.
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abide by Parden or to overrule it. It chose the latter.20 9
Two brief points should be made about Welch. First, it is clear from
Justice Powell's opinion in Welch that he intended no shift in doctrine
from that which he articulated in Atascadero. As this article suggests,
Atascadero established an analytical framework inconsistent with Parden.
Welch, in overturning Parden, simply did explicitly what Atascadero had
already done implicitly. Justice Powell's reasoning, in both cases, is
plainly that whenever a private enforcement suit based on federal legislation is brought against a state which has not expressly consented to the
suit, the eleventh amendment bars the suit unless congress makes "unmistakably clear in the language of the statute" its intention to allow the
suit.

2 10

Consequently, Welch has no additional impact on the views expressed in this article about either the eleventh amendment or the
Court's analysis of the eleventh amendment, save for the significant fact
that Welch expressly overturns Parden, the progenitor of the analytical
framework on which this article is based. But of course, this article has
already criticized Atascadero for implicitly overturning Parden. The Welch
Court's decision to make the demise of Parden explicit simply adds another wrongly reasoned case to the stack.
The second point to be made about Welch concerns an argument the
Court failed to address as it discarded Parden. One question on which
the Court granted certiorari in Welch was the continued viability of the
"doctrine of implied waiver as set forth in Parden,'' 2 1 1 a question going
to the heart of whether Parden ought to be formally overruled. Remarka2 12
bly, the Court never discussed this implied waiver strand of analysis.
Save for one quote pulled from the dissent in Parden, the focus of the
Court's discussion of Parden was on whether congressional authorization
could be found in the absence of "unmistakably clear" statutory language. 2 13 Thus, the Court once again missed or ignored the crucial dis209. Id. at 2948.
210. Atascadero, 473 U.S. at 242; Welch, 107 S. Ct. at 2948. Justice Powell assumed in
Welch, without deciding, that the fourteenth amendment was not the sole source of congressional authority to subject unconsenting states to suits in federal court. Parden had
concluded that Congress had such power under the commerce clause. Employees assumed
as much without discussion. Since Fitzpatnck, however, cases have assumed that this power
might be limited to the fourteenth amendment.
211. 107S. Ct. at2946.
212. The Court cannot entirely be blamed for this omission. Of the briefs filed with the
Court, only one amicus brief discussed Parden s constructive consent doctrine. Brief of the
Council of State Governments, International City Management Association, National Association of Counties, National Governors' Association, National League of Cities, and
U.S. Conference of Mayors as Amic Cuiae in Support of Respondents at 25-28, Welch v.
State Dep't of Highways & Pub. Transp., 107 S. Ct. 2941 (1987) (No. 85-1716).
213. Justice White's dissent in Parden stated that "[o]nly when Congress has clearly
considered the problem and expressly declared that any State which undertakes given
regulable conduct will be deemed thereby to have waived its immunity should courts disallow the invocation of this defense." 377 U.S. at 198-99 (White, J., dissenting) (quoted in
Welch, 107 S.Ct. at 2948). After quoting this language, the W1elch Court discussed the
requirement imposed by Employees and Atascadero that Congress state its intent to override
the eleventh amendment in express language. The Court concluded that Parden, being
inconsistent with this requirement, should be overruled. In reaching this conclusion, the
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tinction between the explicit congressional authorization analysis and
the constructive consent/implicit congressional authorization analysis
called for by Parden and its progeny.
Justice White's concurring opinion brings home the same point
from a different perspective. In the first sentence of Justice White's one
paragraph concurrence he notes approvingly the Court's refusal to address the question of "whether the Jones Act affords a remedy to
seamen employed by the States." '2 14 At first glance, this point seems
irreconcilable with the Court's holding. It would seem that in holding
that Congress did not make sufficiently clear its intent to subject states
to suits under the Jones Act, the Court necessarily resolves the very
2 15
question Justice White says is left open.
The only way Justice White's concurring opinion can be reconciled
with the Court's holding is by recognizing, as this article suggests, that
there are two distinct levels of congressional intent that need to be analyzed. The first level focuses on whether Congress intended to abrogate
the immunity of unconsenting states. The Court correctly concluded,
based on the "unmistakably clear" rule, that such intent could not be
found in the Jones Act. 2 1 6 The second level focuses on whether Congress intended that the Jones Act provisions give a remedy to seamen
against consenting states. The Court noted the concession by the parties that Texas had not expressly consented to this suit. 2 17 However,
the Court failed to address the question of whether, much less what kind
of, implied consent might suffice, other than by bare implication from its
decision to overrule Parden.
In the end, what makes Welch most paradoxical is the juxtaposition
of the Court's response to Justice Brennan's dissent and its discussion of
Parden. The Court's discussion of Parden disregards the fact that a whole
line of cases that could have overruled Parden did not; overlooks the implied consent strand of analysis which emerged from Parden and that
same line of cases; relies heavily on the one significant case (Atascadero)
that ignored Parden; and finally overrules Parden. Then the Court complains that the dissent urges that Hans v. Louisiana be overruled in violation of the long-standing doctrine of stare decisis, "any departure from
[which] demands special justification. ' 2 18 The Court would do a better
service to those who struggle to comprehend what has often been
viewed as the "Twilight Zone" of federal jurisdiction 2 19 if it would be
more mindful of its own pronouncements of the importance of stare decisis "by whose circumspect observance the wisdom of this Court as an
Court glossed over the fact that Employees had not found it necessary to overrule Parden on
grounds of inconsistency, and ignored the fact that the Employees express language requirement had been imposed only because no basis for state consent was found.

214. 107 S. Ct. at 2957 (White, J., concurring).
215. However, the Court confirms in a footnote that it is not resolving this question.
Id. at 2947 n.6.
216. Id. at 2947.
217. Id. at 2946.
218. Id. at 2948 (quoting Arizona v. Rumsey, 467 U.S. 203, 212 (1984)).
219. See Lichtenstein, supra note 1,at 381.
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institution transcending the moment can2 2 0alone be brought to bear on
the difficult problems that confront us."

220. 107 S. Ct. at 2948-49 (quoting Green v. United States, 355 U.S. 184, 215 (1957)
(Frankfurter, J., dissenting)).

